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The problems studied in this thesis fall within two different topics in network
information theory. The first part of this dissertation will be about information
theoretic security and the second about distributed source coding. In the fol-
lowing a brief description of these problems will be given.
In information theoretic security, we look at two different types of timing
channels andwe quantify themaximum rate at which a transmitter can commu-
nicate information reliably to a legitimate receiver while keeping an eavesdrop-
per in the dark. The first timing channel that we study is the Poisson channel
which is used to model certain direct detection optical communication systems.
To transmit a message on this channel, the transmitter encodes information by
modulating the intensity of an optical signal while the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper use the arrival moments of the individual photons to decide
which message was transmitted. The second timing channel studied is the ex-
ponential server queue. Here the transmitter encodes a message using a chosen
sequence of packets inter-arrival times and both the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper use the corresponding inter-departures from their respective ex-
ponential server queues to decode the transmitted message.
In distributed source coding, we consider a rate-distortion problem in which
a decoder is interested in estimating two correlated Gaussian random variables
with mean-square error distortion constraints on each of the reproductions. The
variables to be estimated are the roots of a given Gauss-Markov tree and each
encoder observes one of the leaves of that tree. We show that a simple compres-
sion architecture that performs separate lossy quantization followed by Slepian-
Wolf binning is sum-rate optimal for this problem.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Information theory at its core revolves around two central questions: (1) What
is the highest data rate at which reliable communication can take place over a
given channel? and (2) What is the minimum rate required to describe a source
within a given distortion constraint? The answer to both questions is known
for most point-to-point communication systems. The picture however is far
from being complete when we enter the realm of network information theory,
i.e., when more than two participants (transmitter/receiver) are involved in the
communication. The problems discussed in this thesis fall within this area.
This thesis has two distinct directions. In the first part we consider two prob-
lems in information theoretic security. For two different types of timing chan-
nels, we find the highest rate at which a transmitter can send information reli-
ably to a legitimate receiver with zero information leakage to an eavesdropper.
In the second part we solve a problem in distributed source coding. We find
the minimum sum rate required to compress two remote correlated Gaussian
sources — subject to mean-square error distortion constraints on each of the re-
constructions — under a special covariance structure between the two sources
and the observations of the encoders.
One can probably think of a convoluted (unnatural) way to link the two
topics studied in this thesis. I will however refrain from such an attempt here.
The reader will undeniably feel some discontinuity between the chapters, this
discontinuity however brings with it some freedom as the chapters can be read
in any particular order.
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1.1 Information Theoretic Security
Like all design problems, constructing a communication system requires select-
ing from among several possible technologies by weighing their relative mer-
its. The criteria of this comparison are well known: data rate; cost; complexity;
bandwidth; reliability, both as a measure of fidelity and longevity; power; and
latency. These parameters have received considerable attention within the con-
text of classical communications engineering, and they are now reasonably well
understood for most point-to-point communication scenarios.
More recently, security has been added to the list of criteria by which com-
munication systems are evaluated. This is especially true in the context of wire-
less communication, which, when compared to wireline communication, is evi-
dently more prone to casual eavesdropping. Security might appear to be a mis-
placed requirement of a communication system, because existing cryptographic
protocols can always be added to any system that provides basic communica-
tion functionality. But these protocols are not provably secure, so there is no
guarantee that they will not be broken in the future. At the same time, it is
now recognized that communication systems themselves can provide intrinsic
security even without the use of conventional cryptography. For instance, the
transmitter can beamform to the intended receiver [1]-[2], channel randomness
can be used for secret key generation [3], and coding can be employed to reduce
the amount of information that is leaked to an eavesdropper [4]. We shall call
the last of these techniques wiretap coding.
The idea behind wiretap coding dates back to the pioneering work of
Wyner [4] and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [49], but it has received a surge of attention
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of late with the rise of wireless communication [11]-[15]. The idea is that the in-
tended receiver and any eavesdropper that is present will inevitably observe the
transmitted signal through different channels. The transmitter can then encode
the message so that it can be decoded by the intended receiver while the output
of the eavesdropper’s channel is virtually pure noise. Wiretap coding thereby
provides provable security, but it typically requires reducing the data rate. It
also requires the transmitter to know the law of both the legitimate receiver’s
and the eavesdropper’s channel.
Most recent work in wiretap coding concentrated on finding the secrecy ca-
pacity—the maximum rate at which a transmitter can communicate reliably to a
legitimate receiver with zero information leakage to an eavesdropper—of radio
frequency channels. In this thesis we investigate the secrecy capacity of certain
timing channels by looking at two different channels in this class, the first one
is the Poisson channel and the second is the exponential server queue.
1.1.1 Secrecy Capacity of the Poisson channel
For radio-frequency (RF) channels with multipath fading, it can be nearly im-
possible to learn the eavesdropper’s channel. Multipath fading makes the
strength of the channel a sensitive function of the (unknown) position of the
eavesdropper. In practice, it might be possible to guarantee that the eavesdrop-
per is farther away from the transmitter than the legitimate receiver is, but this is
clearly not sufficient to determine the eavesdropper’s channel. Indeed, it is not
even sufficient to guarantee that the eavesdropper’s channel is weaker than the
legitimate receiver’s. Making matters worse, the eavesdropper can even control
3
her fading by moving around to find the strongest possible signal. Of course,
not all RF channels are subject to multipath fading, but even the possibility that
multipath might be present makes it difficult to provide guarantees on the rela-
tive strengths of the legitimate receiver’s and the eavesdropper’s channel.
Wireless communication systems operating in the optical and near-optical
band are intrinsically more secure than those operating in the RF band. Infrared
(IR) systems are very amenable to beamforming [5], and some ultraviolet (UV)
systems experience high atmospheric attenuation, which enables secure short-
range communication by guaranteeing that eavesdroppers beyond a certain dis-
tance are kept in the dark. Indeed, secure IR systems based on these advantages
have been demonstrated [6]-[7] and UV systems are under development [8]-[9].
Despite this apparent advantage, relatively little is known about how to per-
form wiretap coding for near-optical systems. We examine the fundamental
limits of coding for secure communication over optical channels by studying
the secrecy capacity of the Poisson channel, a common model for direct detec-
tion optical communications systems. In such systems the transmitter sends
information by modulating the intensity of an optical signal while the receiver
observes the arrival moments of individual photons. The capacity of this chan-
nel has been determined under peak power constraint on the transmitted opti-
cal power by Kabanov [16] and under both average and peak power constraints
by Davis [17]. Wyner [18] derived the reliability function of this channel for all
rates below capacity and constructed exponentially optimal codes. Multiple-
access Poisson channels were studied in [19]-[20] whereas broadcast Poisson
channels were considered in [21] and [22]. The capacity of the Poisson channel
has also been investigated in the presence of fading [24]. The second chapter
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of this thesis will be dedicated to finding the secrecy capacity of the Poisson
channel.
1.1.2 Secrecy Capacity of the Exponential Server Queue
Timing channels are by their own nature propitious to covert communication.
That is because the information contained in the timing of events is usually
not considered meaningful data and only the content of the event is of impor-
tance. Consider for instance a communication network, where information is
transmitted using packets. Alice and Bob, as usual trying to evade Eve’s prying
eyes, can convey information to each other through the timing of the packets.
Eve, who is just monitoring the content of the packets, will be fooled into think-
ing that Alice and Bob are talking about an innocuous subject like the weather
whereas in fact they are exchanging love letters. In principle, if the packets ex-
perience deterministic delays in the network, the information capacity of this
hidden channel can be arbitrarily large. Of course, packets in the network are
usually subject to random delays, and so the capacity of this channel will be
bounded. The question now is the following. What if Eve became aware of
this little game, can Alice and Bob still be able to communicate secretly using
this method? And if so, how much information can be transmitted securely be-
tween them? Clearly, if packet delays are deterministic, secure communication
is going to be problematic. However, when randomness comes into play, the
answer can be drastically different. Although generally considered a nuisance
for reliable communication, randomness as research have shown [4] is actually
a blessing in the context of secure communication.
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In order to get a deeper understanding of this problem, we need to use a
tractable model for abstracting the randomness affecting the transit times of
the packets through the network. The first model that comes to mind is the
exponential server queue or, using Kendall’s notation, the :=M=1 queue. The
assumption that a packet will receive an exponentially distributed service time
in a node of the network—independently from its service time in prior nodes—
is attributed to Kleinrock. This assumption is in fact known as Kleinrock’s inde-
pendence assumption (or approximation) in queueing theory. Referring to this
assumption, and in his own words, Kleinrock said [39]
Now in networking, every pair of users is a different commodity. So
from a theoretical point of view, you just can’t solve these problems.
So I asked, what can I do? And I made an assumption. I called it
the independence assumption. And that cracked the problem wide
open. The analysis became totally doable.
But even before this approximation, the exponential distribution has had a
prominent role in the development of queueing networks. Indeed, most fun-
damental queueing theory results involve directly or indirectly :=M=1 queues.
Jackson’s and Burke’s theorems are just two concrete examples of such results.
The exponential distribution had also its share of contribution to the devel-
opment of information theory. Arguably however the impact of this distribu-
tion on Shannon’s theory is much less pronounced than its impact on Erlang’s
theory. Perhaps because it was eclipsed by the Gaussian distribution. Never-
theless, from an information theoretic perspective, the exponential distribution
shares many of the interesting properties of its Gaussian counterpart [40]. In
our biased opinion, probably the most prominent paper that exemplifies the
6
fundamental role that the :=M=1 queue can play in information theory is [41].
In that paper, Anantharam and Verdu´ studied timing channels by looking at
a single server queue where every packet has an independent service (transit)
time. They showed that the information capacity of a queue with service rate 
is lower bounded by 
e
and that this lower bound is attained when the service
time is exponentially distributed. That is the exponential server timing channel
(ESTC) or the =M=1 queue has the lowest capacity. The =M=1 queue is also
one of the rare non-trivial queues for which the capacity is known in closed-
form. In this regard, the =M=1 queue plays for single server queues, the same
role played by the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel for additive
noise channels.
Due to the fundamental nature of the :=M=1 queue, we will adopt this model
to study the secrecy problem described in the beginning of this section. The
third chapter of this thesis is dedicated to finding the secrecy capacity of the
exponential server queue.
1.2 Distributed Source Coding: Compressing Neighbors in a
Gauss-Markov Tree
One does not need to be an information theorist to appreciate the importance of
knowing the compression limits of information sources and designing schemes
to attain these limits. Algorithms for lossless and lossy data compression are
pervasive today and everyone is using them without necessarily knowing how
they function. The widespread use of these algorithms should not hide the fact
that our understanding of the problems of compression is still very limited. An
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area where progress is very much needed is distributed source coding. In dis-
tributed source coding, multiple correlated sources are observed by multiple
encoders. These encoders communicate their messages over rate-constrained
channels to one decoder (or potentially multiple decoders). The decoder then
uses these messages to form an estimate of a subset (or all) of the sources. Ap-
plications for distributed source coding abound, for example to name just a few,
sensor networks and video coding for multimedia applications. The objective
of this part of this thesis is to gain a better understanding of this area by solving
one particular distributed source coding problem that shall be described shortly.
In the following, we will restrict our attention to Gaussian sources. Since
some practitioners might object to this simplification, we will give here two rea-
sons that we believe are sufficient to alleviate their objections. The first one is
that Gaussian sources are ”friendly” objects in information theory. IndeedGaus-
sian random variables possess several fundamental properties that are very use-
ful in proving theorems in information theory. The second reason— which will
be probably more appealing to these practitioners— is that knowing the com-
pression limits for Gaussian sources can usually serve as a benchmark for other
sources. For instance, it is known that for a given variance, a Gaussian source
has the largest rate-distortion function.
Now let us begin at the beginning. Consider a source of information that
is generating a stream of independent and identically distributed zero mean
Gaussian random variables with unit variance. Shannon showed in 1959 that
the minimum number of bits per sample that an encoder needs to send to a
8
decoder to achieve a mean square error distortion d is1
R(d) =
1
2
log+

1
d

bits/sample:
Now consider another problem where instead of having one source and one
encoder, we have two correlated Gaussian sources with correlation coefficient 
and two encoders each one of them observing one of the sources. The encoders
send messages, without cooperating, to a central decoder whose purpose is to
estimate the two sources within a maximum mean square error distortion d1
on the reconstruction of the first source and d2 on the second. If we denote
by Ri; i = 1; 2 the number of bits per sample used by the ith encoder, then a
natural question to ask is the following. What is the minimum sum rate (i.e.,
minR1 + R2) required to achieve the two distortions d1 and d2? This question
remained open until 2006, when Wagner et al. showed that this sum rate is
given by
R(d1; d2) =
1
2
log+
 
1  2
2d1d2
"
1 +
s
1 +
42d1d2
(1  2)2
#!
bits/sample:
Our goal in this part of the thesis is to generalize this result in the following
sense: while still assuming that there are two Gaussian sources that we would
like to estimate, we allow more than two encoders and (more importantly) we
assume that these encoders might not have direct access to the sources. By that
wemean that each encoder now observes one of the sources through an additive
white gaussian noise channel. Moreover the noise corrupting the observation of
the ith encoder can be correlated with the noise corrupting the observation of
the jth encoder. In chapter 4 of this thesis, we find the sum-rate for this problem
under a specific covariance structure between the observations of the encoders.
1The logarithm is base two.
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More specifically, we solve the problem when the two sources of interest are the
roots of a Gauss-Markov tree and the encoders observe the leaves of that tree.
We believe that this problem is important on multiple levels. First because it
is a natural generalization of several distributed source coding problems. Start-
ing from the Gaussian CEO problem [62], the Gaussian two-encoder problem
[54] and finally the Gaussian many-help-one problem with a tree structure [55].
All these problems can be seen as special cases of the one descried in chapter 4.
The second reason is that studying remote or indirect multiterminal source cod-
ing problems usually allows us to find outer bounds on the rate region of other
(direct) multiterminal source coding problems. For example, the Gaussian CEO
problemwas instrumental in the solution of the Gaussian two-encoder problem.
We hope therefore that the sum-rate result provided here could be used by oth-
ers to solve future distributed source coding problems. The third reason is that
we think that the conditional independence structure — that is present in our
problem — could potentially be a key in differentiating between “hard” prob-
lems and solvable ones. Indeed, most multiterminal source coding problems for
which the rate region is known involve some sort of conditional independence
(see for example [62], [63], [64]). This conditional independence is either present
naturally in the source, e.g., [62] or is introduced artificially using source aug-
mentation, e.g., [54]. Finally we think that the solution that we provide could
be a stepping stone to solve the problem of reproducing three neighboring vari-
ables in the tree. By removing the distortion constraint on the middle variable
of the triple, one could obtain a result for pairs of variables that are separated by
at most one variable in the tree, which in particular would solve the Gaussian
one-help-two problem under a tree constraint. The ultimate goal would be to
handle distortion constraints on an arbitrary number of variables in the tree.
10
CHAPTER 2
SECRECY CAPACITY OF THE POISSON CHANNEL
2.1 Introduction
We study in this chapter the degraded Poisson wiretap channel. The legitimate
receiver observes a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate
AyXt + y where fXt; 0  t  Tg is the signal transmitted. The eavesdropper’s
observation is also a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate
AzXt + z. For degradedness we assume that1 Ay  Az and y  AyAzz. In
Theorem 1 we provide a closed form expression of the secrecy capacity as a
function of the parameters (Au; u); u 2 fy; zg. This result is further extended
by Theorem 5which gives a full characterization of the rate equivocation region.
Our achievability proof uses stochastic encoding as well as the structured
codes constructed by Wyner for the Poisson channel [18]. As for the converse,
we will see that the infinite bandwidth nature of the Poisson channel makes it
possible to prove the converse using only simple properties of the conditional
expectation combined with basic information theoretical inequalities. This is
to be contrasted with the converse of the (finite bandwidth) Gaussian channel
which is proved using the entropy power inequality (EPI) [25] or the worst ad-
ditive noise result developed in [26]. As an illustration for the basic ideas that
underpin the converse for the Poisson channel, we will start by considering here
the more familiar infinite bandwidth Gaussian channel and we will see also that
for this channel the proof of the converse simplifies considerably.
1These conditions were shown to be sufficient for degradedness in [21]. The argument is
reproduced in Lemma 1 below.
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For this purpose, consider the continuous time Gaussian wiretap channel
with bandwidth B (later we will let B tend to infinity) and with a power con-
straint P . This continuous time channel is equivalent to 2B uses per second
of the discrete time Gaussian channel depicted in Figure 2.1. The input sig-
nal is power constrained, i.e., E[X2]  P , the legitimate receiver observes
Y = X + W1 and the eavesdropper receives Z = Y + W2 = X + W1 + W2,
whereWi  N (0; NiB) andW1 ?? W2.
Figure 2.1: The discrete time Gaussian wiretap channel
Define ~N by 1~N =
1
N1
  1
N1+N2
and observe that
~N
N1
Y = X +
N1
N2
Z + ~W; (2.1)
where ~W = W1   N1N2W2. It is easy to see that ~W  N (0; ~NB) and E[ ~W (W1 +
W2)] = 0, it follows therefore that ~W ?? W1 + W2 (since they are jointly
Gaussian). For the discrete time Gaussian wiretap channel, it is known that
the secrecy capacity is given by maxpX (I(X;Y )   I(X;Z)). For the continu-
ous time channel counterpart with bandwidth B, the secrecy capacity becomes
CBs = 2BmaxpX (I(X;Y )  I(X;Z)).
In [25], using the celebrated EPI, a closed form expression for the secrecy
capacity of the discrete time Gaussian wiretap channel was obtained. In just a
few steps, we will see that the secrecy capacity of the infinite bandwidth (B !
1) Gaussian wiretap channel can be found much more simply. Starting with
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(2.1) we obtain the following sequence of inequalities
I(X;Y ) = I(X;X +
N1
N2
Z + ~W )
(a)
 I(X;X + ~W;Z)
(b)
= h(X + ~W;Z)  h(X + ~W;ZjX)
(c)
 h(X + ~W ) + h(Z)  h(X + ~W;ZjX)
(d)
= h(X + ~W ) + h(Z)  h(X + ~W jX)  h(ZjX)
(e)
= I(X;X + ~W ) + I(X;Z);
Inequality (a) follows from the data processing inequality, equalities in (b) and
(e) are standard information theory identities, (c) follows from the indepen-
dence bound on entropy and finally (d) holds becauseX + ~W andX +W1+W2
are conditionally independent givenX (i.e., (X+ ~W ) ?? (X+W1+W2)jX). Basi-
cally, the key identity needed to go from (a) to (e) is the following: if Y1 ?? Y2jX ,
then we have I(X;Y1; Y2)  I(X;Y1) + I(X;Y2). A proof of this simple inequal-
ity in a more general setting will be given later and will be used in part of the
converse for the Poisson channel. Going back to the Gaussian problem, we see
that
CBs = 2Bmax
PX
(I(X;Y )  I(X;Z))  2Bmax
PX
I(X;X + ~W ) = B ln(1 +
P
B ~N
):
(2.2)
For a fixed bandwidth B, this last inequality is not tight. But letting B !1 we
obtain
C1s , lim
B!1
CBs 
P
~N
=
P
N1
  P
N1 +N2
: (2.3)
However, sincemaxpX (I(X;Y ) I(X;Z))  maxpX I(X;Y ) maxpX I(X;Z), we
also have that
C1s  lim
B!1

B ln(1 +
P
BN1
) B ln(1 + P
B(N1 +N2)
)

=
P
N1
  P
N1 +N2
: (2.4)
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It follows that C1s =
P
N1
  P
N1+N2
.
This remarkably simple approach will be useful for the Poisson channel.
More specifically, when y
Ay
= z
Az
, the eavesdropper’s signal Z is a thinned ver-
sion of the legitimate receiver’s signal Y , i.e., 2 Y = Z + ~Z where Z ?? ~ZjX ,
the approach above gives that I(X;Y )   I(X;Z)  I(X; ~Z). Since ~Z is itself a
doubly stochastic Poisson process, the mutual information I(X; ~Z) can be max-
imized using the martingale techniques of Kabanov [16] and an (achievable)
upperbound can be obtained on I(X;Y )   I(X;Z). When y
Ay
< z
Az
, a different
bounding technique using only simple properties of the conditional expectation
will be devised.
Although no “sophisticated” tools are required to prove the converse, we
show in Section 2.7 that using some new results in information theory an alter-
native proof can be provided. This different proof hinges on the link that has
been established between the mutual information (MI) and the minimummean
square estimation (MMSE) in Poisson channels [27]. It is worth noting at this
point that the link between the MI and the MMSE in the Gaussian setting [28]
has been also used recently for different Gaussian wiretap channels [29], [30].
One of the distinctive aspects of our work is that we do not resort to the
-discretization method introduced by Wyner [18]. This method was used to
approximate the Poisson channel by a binary DMC thereby allowing the trans-
position of the widely known results for DMCs to the Poisson channel. This
technique leads to extensive computations, especially when we are interested
in the secrecy capacity as there are now two conflicting objectives involved, the
maximization of the information rate at the legitimate receiver and the mini-
2The time dependence has been dropped to ease the notations. Refer to the converse part in
this chapter for a mathematically precise statement.
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mization of the information leakage at the eavesdropper. We circumvent the
use of this method by using the techniques described above.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
setup of the problem and presents the main result of this chapter as well as
some interpretations of the obtained result. The proof of the achievability of the
secrecy capacity is given in Section 2.3 and the proof of the converse is presented
in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we extend the main result by giving a complete
characterization of the rate-equivocation region. Finally, in Section 2.6, some
possible future directions are discussed.
2.2 Problem and Result Statement
The input process to the Poisson channel is a waveform denoted by XT0 ,
fXt; 0  t  Tg satisfying Xt  0 for all t. We further assume that the in-
put process is peak power limited, i.e., Xt  1 for all t. The received signal at
the legitimate receiver Y T0 is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instanta-
neous rate AyXt + y, i.e., given XT0 the stochastic process Y T0 has independent
increments with Y0 = 0 and for 0  s  t  T we have
Pr(Yt   Ys = kjXT0 ) =
1
k!
k(s; t)e (s;t); k 2 N;
where
(s; t) =
Z t
s
(AyX + y)d:
The parameter Ay > 0 accounts for possible signal attenuation at the receiver.
The parameter y  0 is the dark current intensity which results from back-
ground noise and bears no information on the input process XT0 . Similarly the
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output process of the eavesdropper ZT0 is a doubly stochastic Poisson process
with instantaneous rate AzXt + z.
In this chapter, the space of doubly stochastic Poisson processes on the inter-
val [0; T ] will be denoted by P(T ). Following the notation used in [27] the out-
put process of the Poisson channel in the interval [0; T ] with instantaneous rate
Xt+will be denoted byPT0 (XT0 +). We use hXtis to designateE[XtjPs0(Xs0)],
as such hXtit refers to the causal conditional mean estimate and hXtiT to the
noncausal one.
All stochastic processes considered in this chapter are defined on a common
measurable space (
;F). We use F s to denote the internal history generated by
the process s0.
In this chapter we are interested in the degraded Poisson wiretap channel.
Lapidoth et al. [21] gave conditions on the parameters (Au; u); u 2 fy; zg
for stochastic degradedness. These conditions are presented in the following
lemma. In order to prepare for the results to come we will also briefly go over
the proof of this lemma.
Lemma 1 (Lapidoth, Telatar and Urbanke [21]). The eavesdropper’s channel is
stochastically degraded with respect to the legitimate receiver’s channel, if
Ay  Az; (2.5)
and
y  Ay
Az
z: (2.6)
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Proof. Let eY T0 (cf. Figure 2.2) be the process defined as follows3
eYt = Yt +Ht; t 2 [0; T ]; (2.7)
where Ht is a homogeneous Poisson process with rate ~ =
Ay
Az
z   y (note
that ~  0 by (2.6)) independent of (XT0 ; Y T0 ). It follows that eY T0 is a doubly
stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate AyXt+y+~ = AyXt+
Ay
Az
z.
The process ZT0 is then obtained from eY T0 by thinning with erasure probability
1  Az
Ay
(note that because of (2.5) this quantity is  0).
In the rest of this chapter we will assume that at least one of the inequalities
(2.5) or (2.6) is strict. Note that this assumption can be made without losing gen-
erality for if there was an equality in (2.5) and (2.6) then the legitimate receiver’s
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel will be identical and the secrecy capac-
ity will be zero.
Figure 2.2: The degraded Poisson wiretap channel
We move now to the description of the information transmission aspect of
the problem. The transmitter wishes to communicate a message U uniformly
distributed on U = f1; :::;Mg. An (M;T ) code (ET ; DT ) for the Poisson wiretap
channel is a stochastic encoder ET that maps a message U to a waveform XT0
3As depicted in Figure 2.2, the description provided here is that of a physically degraded Pois-
son channel and not of themore general stochastically degraded Poisson channel. This restriction
is harmless however since the secrecy capacity depends only on the conditional marginals.
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which satisfies the peak power constraint and a decoder DT : P(T ) ! U . The
transmission rate of this code is
R =
H(U)
T
=
1
T
lnM:
The average probability of error at the legitimate receiver is
Pe =
1
M
MX
m=1
Pr
 
DT (Y
T
0 ) 6= mjU = m

: (2.8)
The level of secrecy is measured by 1
T
I(U ;ZT0 ). This normalized mutual infor-
mation quantifies the rate of the information leaked to the eavesdropper about
the message U . As such our goal is to make this quantity as small as possible.
Definition A secrecy rate Rs is said to be achievable4 for the Poisson wiretap
channel if for all  > 0 and all sufficiently large T , there exists an (M;T ) code
such that
lnM
T
 Rs   
Pe  
1
T
I(U ;ZT0 )   (2.9)
The supremum of achievable secrecy rates will be called the secrecy capacity. The
main result of this chapter is the following.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity of the degraded Poisson wiretap channel is given by5
Cs = 
(Ay   Az) + ln
 

y
y
zz
!
+ ln

(Az
 + z)z
(Ay + y)y

; (2.10)
where  is the unique solution in [0; 1] to the following equation
(Ay
 + y)Ay
(Az + z)Az
= eAz Ay
(Ay + y)
Ay+y
(Az + z)Az+z
zz

y
y
: (2.11)
4Equivalently, we say that Rs is achievable with perfect secrecy.
5If  = 0, the convention is that 00 = 1.
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Figure 2.3: The secrecy capacity for Ay = 1, y = z = 0:5.
This result assumes that (Az; z) is known to the transmitter. Yet it follows
that Cs is an achievable rate with perfect secrecy even if the eavesdropper ob-
serves PT0 (A0zXT0 + 0z), where A0z and 0z are unknown but satisfy A0z  Az and
0z  A
0
z
Az
z.6 Thus, only one-sided estimates of Az and z are needed. In prac-
tice, an upper bound on Az could be provided by guaranteeing that any po-
tential eavesdropper is more than a certain distance away from the transmitter.
A lower bound on the dark current z could be provided using ambient noise
measurements and the known physical limitations of existing receivers.
6If V T0  PT0 (A0zXT0 + 0z) where A0z and 0z are unknown but satisfy A0z  Az and 0z 
A0z
Az
z then, from Lemma 1, V T0 can be viewed as a degraded version of ZT0 . This means that
I(U ;V T0 )  I(U ;ZT0 ) and a fortiori limT!1 1T I(U ;ZT0 ) = 0) limT!1 1T I(U ;V T0 ) = 0.
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Figure 2.3 depicts the secrecy capacity versus Az for Ay = 1 and y = z =
0:5. As expected, the secrecy capacity is a deceasing function of Az. When Az =
0, the secrecy capacity is equal to the capacity of the main channel and it then
decreases until it reaches zero when Az = Ay = 1.
Worst case scenario: A particularly insightful case is when y
Ay
= z
Az
= .
This situation happens when the eavesdropper observes a thinned version of
the signal of the legitimate receiver, i.e., Ht  0 in (2.7). In this case, after some
algebraic manipulations, we obtain that
 =
(1 + )1+
e
  ; (2.12)
and the secrecy capacity reduces to
Cs = (y   z)
 
1
e

1 +
1

1+
  (1 + ) ln

1 +
1

!
: (2.13)
This is saying that the secrecy capacity is the difference between the capacity
of the main channel (the channel between the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver) and the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel. For instance, in the
special case when there is no dark current y = z = 0, we find that  = 1e and
the secrecy capacity reduces to
Cs =
Ay   Az
e
: (2.14)
For a degraded DMC, Wyner [4] showed that the secrecy capacity is equal to
maxpX (I(X;Y )  I(X;Z)). Hence the following inequality is always satisfied
Secrecy Capacity  CM   CW ;
where CM is the capacity of the main channel and CW is the capacity of the
eavesdropper’s channel. As shown in [31]-[32], there is equality in the inequal-
ity above if there is an input probability distribution pX that simultaneously
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maximizes I(X;Y ) and I(X;Z). This is exactly what is happening here, when
y
Ay
= z
Az
the mutual information I(XT0 ;Y T0 ) and I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) are both maximized
by letting the input XT0 cycle infinitely fast between its extreme values, i.e., the
peak power 1 and 0 with Pr(Xt = 1) = 1   Pr(Xt = 0) =  = (1+)1+e   .
In order to achieve this limit the communication bandwidth must become very
large. However, we are assuming here that this bandwidth is still negligible
compared to the optical center frequency at which the communication system
is operating. If this is not the case anymore, then the channel model that we are
using is no longer appropriate.
Before we proceed further with the presentation of the problem considered
here, we give a lemma that will prove to be useful in the proofs of the achiev-
ability and the converse, a proof of this result can be found for instance in [16].
Lemma 2. The mutual information between the inputXT0 and the outputPT0 (XT0 +)
can be upper bounded as follows7
I(XT0 ;PT0 (XT0 + )) 
Z T
0
(E[#(Xt)]  #(E[Xt]))dt; (2.15)
where #(x) = (x+ ) ln(x+ ).
2.3 Achievability of Cs
Our achievability proof relies on the structured codes that were designed for
the Poisson channel by Wyner [18]. As pointed out by one of the reviewers, an
alternative proof can be obtained by restricting the input process to the channel
to be a piecewise constant binary waveform and using the lower bound on the
7Note that some authors use the function #(x) = (x+ ) ln(x+ )   ln instead but the
constant term  ln cancels out here.
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secrecy capacity derived in [33],[34]. Before delving into the details of the proof,
we will briefly describe the code construction and the properties inherited by
this code.
Wyner codesW(T;M; k): Let T ,M and k be given, and construct anM M
k

binary matrix as follows. The columns of are the
 
M
k

binaryM -vectors with
exactly k ones andM  k zeros. Now partition the interval [0; T ] into  M
k

subin-
tervals of equal length $T , T(Mk )
and construct M waveforms fXT0 (m)gMm=1 as
follows
Xt(m) = (m;n); t 2 ((n  1)$T ; n$T ]; n = 1; :::;

M
k

: (2.16)
For  = k
M
fixed, these codes satisfy
1
T
ft : Xt(m) = 1g = ; for allm; (2.17)
with  being the Lebesgue measure. If moreover M = eRT , for T >> 1, Wyner
showed that form 6= m0
1
T
ft : Xt(m) = 1; Xt(m0) = 0g  (1  ): (2.18)
As such for T large enough the codewords fXT0 (m)gMm=1 will behave as if they
were chosen independently.
After this brief overview of Wyner codes we are in a position to state the
achievability theorem and prove it.
Theorem 2. Any secrecy rate Rs < Cs is achievable.
Proof. Let  > 0 be arbitrary and let Rs = Cs   . Define
Ru = 
(Au + u) ln(Au + u) + (1  )u lnu
  (Au + u) ln(Au + u); u 2 fy; zg: (2.19)
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After few algebraic manipulations, we can show that
Cs = Ry  Rz:
Given these parameters, the encoder-decoder pair considered here works as fol-
lows.
Encoding: Let M = eRsT and let U be uniformly distributed on U =
f1; :::;Mg. DefineMy = e(Ry  32 )T and following the steps described above con-
struct a code8 C =W(T;My; My). Partition this code arbitrarily intoM smaller
subcodes, i.e., C = [Mi=1Ci. The cardinality of each each subcode Ci will be equal
toMz =
My
M
= e(Rz 

2
)T .
The encoder works as follows, when the message U = m is chosen, the code-
wordXT0 is selected uniformly randomly from Cm. Notice that every subcode Cm
can be viewed as a code for the eavesdropper’s channel withMz codewords and
a uniform prior distribution. The method used to build C mimics the construc-
tion used by Wyner in his original paper [4], where a code for the main channel
is obtained by combining an appropriate number of subcodes that achieve the
rate Rz with vanishing error probability over the eavesdropper’s channel.
Decoding: The decoder considered here is the maximum likelihood decoder
constructed by Wyner [18]. After observing Y T0 , the decoder at the legitimate
receiver computes the following metric
	m =
Z
Sm
dYt; (2.20)
where Sm = ft 2 [0; T ] : Xt(m) = 1g. Then DT (Y T0 ) = m if m maximizes 	m,
with ties resolved in favor of the smallestm.
8Note that even if  is not a rational number, it can be approximated arbitrary close by
rationals.
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Analysis of Pe: The fact that Pe ! 0, follows simply from the fact that Wyner
codes with the peak power 1 and average power  are capacity achieving for
the main channel.
Analysis of 1
T
I(U ;ZT0 ):
Notice first that for each m, the waveform XT0 (m) is piecewise constant. It
follows that a sufficient statistic for making a decision is the number of arrivals
during each subinterval ((n 1)$T ; n$T ], i.e., Zn = Zn$T Z(n 1)$T , n = 1; :::; Ny
with Ny =
 
My
My

. Consequently,
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) = I(X;Z)
I(U ;ZT0 ) = I(U ;Z) (2.21)
where X = [X1; :::; XNy ], Xi = 0 or 1 depending on the choice of the codeword
and Z = [Z1; :::; ZNy ]. The equalities above follows from the fact that Z is a
sufficient statistic.
As a result of Lemma 2, we have
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) 
1
T
Z T
0
(E[z(Xt)]  z(E[Xt]))dt; (2.22)
where z(x) = (Azx + z) ln(Azx + z). Because of the uniform choice in the
encoding scheme and in view of (2.17) we must have that Pr[Xt = 1] = 1  
Pr[Xt = 0] = 
, hence we have
E[z(Xt)] = z(1) + (1  )z(0)
= (Az + z) ln(Az + z) + (1  )z lnz: (2.23)
and
z(E[Xt]) = z() = (Az + z) ln(Az + z): (2.24)
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Consequently, we deduce that
1
T
I(X;Z) =
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 )  Rz: (2.25)
As stated before, every subcode Cm can be viewed as a code for the eavesdrop-
per’s channel. Define m to be the probability of error for code Cm (1  m  M )
with the (optimal) decoder described above. By the aforementioned code con-
struction, the codewords of every subcode Cm (1  m  M ) satisfy (2.17) and
(4.6) (with  replaced by ). These two conditions dictate the pairwise error
probability of the codewords in Cm [18]. Since the overall error probability of
the code Cm is governed by the pairwise error probability [18], it follows that
the error probability m can be made arbitrarily small for every subcode Cm.
Now, from Fano’s inequality we have
H(XjZ; U = m)  H(m) + m lnMz; (2.26)
where H(p) =  p ln(p)  (1  p) ln(1  p) is the binary entropy.
Since the codewords are uniformly distributed in each subcode, we deduce
that H(XjU = m) = lnMz. We conclude therefore that
I(X;ZjU = m) = H(XjU = m) H(XjZ; U = m)
 lnMz   (H(m) + m lnMz): (2.27)
Let  = 1
M
PM
m=1 m, averaging over U and by using the concavity of H() we
find that
I(X;ZjU)  lnMz   (H() +  lnMz): (2.28)
Notice also that U ! X! Z form a Markov chain, i.e.,
1
T
I(U ;Z) =
1
T
I(U;X;Z)  1
T
I(X;ZjU)
=
1
T
I(X;Z)  1
T
I(X;ZjU) (2.29)
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Combined with the last inequality this implies that
1
T
I(U ;Z)  1
T
I(X;Z)  1
T
lnMz +
1
T
(H() +  lnMz): (2.30)
Inequalities (2.25) and (2.30) result in the following
1
T
I(U ;Z)  Rz   1
T
[lnMz   (H() +  lnMz)]: (2.31)
AsMz = e(Rz 

2
)T , this gives
1
T
I(U ;ZT0 ) =
1
T
I(U ;Z)  
2
+
1
T
H() + (Rz   
2
): (2.32)
Since  can be made arbitrarily small we can enforce that 1
T
H() + (Rz   2) 

2
by choosing T large enough. The previous inequality shows therefore that
1
T
I(U ;ZT0 )   and the desired secrecy condition is satisfied.
This shows that any secrecy rate Rs < Cs can be achieved and completes the
achievability proof.
2.4 The Converse for the secrecy capacity
Before delving into the details of the converse we need the following technical
lemma due to Wyner [35].
Lemma 3 (Wyner [35]). If   : 
 ! z is a random variable such that z is a finite set
and T0 = ft; 0  t  Tg is a given stochastic process, then we have
I( ; T0 ) = H( ) H( jT0 ); (2.33)
where H( ) is the usual entropy for discrete random variables and
H( jT0 ) =  E
"X
2z
Pr[  = jFT ] ln Pr[  = jFT ]
#
: (2.34)
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This lemma is standard when all the random variables have discrete alpha-
bets however this extension is needed here since we are dealingwith continuous
time stochastic processes.
The converse theorem will be proved through a sequence of Lemmas. The
first one gives an inequality that must satisfied by every encoder-decoder pair
(ET ; DT ).
Lemma 4. For every (M;T ) code with rate R = lnM
T
we have
R  1
T (1  Pe)
 
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 jZT0 ) + I(U ;ZT0 ) +H(Pe)

: (2.35)
Proof. Let U^ = DT (Y T0 ) denote the output of the decoder at the legitimate re-
ceiver, so that Pe = Pr(U 6= U^). We then have the following sequence of identi-
ties
RT = lnM = H(U)
(a)
= H(U jY T0 ) + I(U ;Y T0 )
(b)
 H(U jU^) + I(U ;Y T0 )
(c)
 H(Pe) + Pe lnM + I(U ;Y T0 ); (2.36)
the equality (a) follows from Wyner’s lemma and the inequality (c) is an ap-
plication of Fano’s inequality. For the inequality (b), since U ! Y T0 ! U^ is a
Markov chain we deduce that9 I(U; Y T0 )  I(U; U^). Now by invoking Wyner’s
lemma again it follows that H(U jY T0 )  H(U jU^).
From Kolmogorov’s formula (see Lemma 3.2 in [35]) we have10
I(U ;Y T0 ; Z
T
0 ) = I(U ;Y
T
0 ) + I(U ;Z
T
0 jY T0 ); (2.37)
9The data processing inequality extends to arbitrary random variables, see for instance The-
orem 3.4 in [35].
10The definition of the conditional mutual information for arbitrary random variables can be
found in [35].
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since U ! Y T0 ! ZT0 is a Markov chain we deduce that11 I(U ;ZT0 jY T0 ) = 0. By
applying Kolmogorov’s formula again we obtain
I(U ;Y T0 ) = I(U ;Y
T
0 ; Z
T
0 ) = I(U ;Z
T
0 ) + I(U ;Y
T
0 jZT0 )
 I(U ;ZT0 ) + I(XT0 ;Y T0 jZT0 ); (2.38)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that U ! XT0 ! Y T0 ! ZT0 form
a Markov chain. Combining this last inequality with (c) and rearranging the
terms yields the desired inequality.
Lemma 5. If E
R T
0
jXt lnXtj <1, then
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 jZT0 ) = I(XT0 ;Y T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) (2.39)
Proof. Applying Kolmogorov’s formula twice gives
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 ; Z
T
0 ) = I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) + I(X
T
0 ;Y
T
0 jZT0 )
= I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 ) + I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 jY T0 ): (2.40)
Since XT0 ! Y T0 ! ZT0 form a Markov chain, we have I(XT0 ;ZT0 jY T0 ) = 0. Con-
sequently we deduce that
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 ) = I(X
T
0 ;Z
T
0 ) + I(X
T
0 ;Y
T
0 jZT0 ): (2.41)
The condition E
R T
0
jXt lnXtj < 1 implies that I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) < 1 and it follows
that I(XT0 ;Y T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) = I(XT0 ;Y T0 jZT0 ).
The goal of the upcoming lemmas is to prove that I(XT0 ;Y T0 jZT0 )  TCs,
11Refer to Lemma 3.1. in [35].
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where Cs is given by (2.10). We first decompose I(XT0 ;Y T0 jZT0 ) as follows
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 jZT0 ) = I(XT0 ;Y T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 )
= I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ; eY T0 )
+ I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 ); (2.42)
where eY T0 has been defined in (2.7). The next two lemmas will provide upper
bounds on I(XT0 ;Y T0 )  I(XT0 ; eY T0 ) and I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 ).
Lemma 6. If E
R T
0
jXt lnXtj <1, then
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ; eY T0 ) Z T
0

Ay
Az
(z(E[Xt])  E[z(Xt)])  (y(E[Xt])  E[y(Xt)])

dt; (2.43)
where y(x) = (Ayx+y) ln(Ayx+y) and z(x) has been defined above analogously.
Proof. Note first that [16], [48]
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 ) =
Z T
0
 
E[y(Xt)]  E[y(E[XtjF tY ])]

dt; (2.44)
and
I(XT0 ; eY T0 ) = Z T
0
 
E[(Xt)]  E[(E[XtjF teY ])] dt; (2.45)
where (x) = (Ayx +
Ay
Az
z) ln(Ayx +
Ay
Az
z). Consequently, using the fact that
(x) = Ay
Az
z(x) + ln(
Ay
Az
)(Ayx +
Ay
Az
z) and after simplifications, we deduce the
following
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ; eY T0 ) = Z T
0
 
E[y(Xt)]  E[y(E[XtjF tY ])]

dt
  Ay
Az
Z T
0
 
E[z(Xt)]  E[z(E[XtjF teY ])] dt: (2.46)
Recall that eY T0 = Y T0 + HT0 , where HT0 is a homogeneous Poisson process in-
dependent of (XT0 ; Y T0 ). Clearly, F teY  F tY _ F tH , with F tY _ F tH = (F tY [ F tH)
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being the smallest sigma-field containing F tY [ F tH . From the independence of
(XT0 ; Y
T
0 ) from HT0 , using the law of redundant conditioning (see, e.g. [48, pp.
281-282]), we deduce that
E[XtjF tY _ F tH ] = E[XtjF tY ] a.s. (2.47)
We can now establish the following sequence of identities
E[z(E[XtjF tY ])]
(a)
= E[z(E[XtjF tY _ F tH ])] (2.48)
(b)
= E[E[z(E[XtjF tY _ F tH ])jF teY ]] (2.49)
(c)
 E[z(E[E[XtjF tY _ F tH ]jF teY ])] (2.50)
(d)
= E[z(E[XtjF teY ])]; (2.51)
where (a) follows from (2.47), (b) follows from the smoothing property of the
conditional expectation, (c) from Jensen’s inequality applied to the convex func-
tion z() and (d) from the fact that F teY  F tY _ F tH and the smoothing property.
We deduce therefore that
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  Z T
0
 
E[y(Xt)]  E[y(E[XtjF tY ])]

dt
  Ay
Az
Z T
0
 
E[z(Xt)]  E[z(E[XtjF tY ])]

dt: (2.52)
A simple derivation shows that the function (x) = y(x)   AyAzz(x) is convex
as
00(x) =
Ay(zAy   yAz)
(Ayx+ y)(Azx+ z)
 0: (2.53)
Now invoking again Jensen’s inequality we obtain that
E[(E[XtjF tY ])]  (E[E[XtjF tY ]]) = (E[Xt]): (2.54)
Using this last inequality and after rearranging the terms we obtain the desired
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result, i.e.,
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  Z T
0
(E[y(Xt)]  y(E[Xt])) dt
  Ay
Az
Z T
0
(E[z(Xt)]  z(E[Xt])) dt: (2.55)
An alternative proof of this lemma using the link provided in [27] between
the MMSE and the mutual information in Poisson channels is given in Section
2.7.1.
Lemma 7. If E
R T
0
jXt lnXtj <1, then
I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 )
 (Ay
Az
  1)
Z T
0
(E[z(Xt)]  z(E[Xt]))dt (2.56)
Proof. Recall thatZT0 was obtained from eY T0 by thinningwith erasure probability
1  Az
Ay
. Let the process ~ZT0 denote those points that were erased, hence we have
that ~ZT0 is a doubly stochastic Poisson process with instantaneous rate (Ay  
Az)Xt+(
Ay
Az
 1)z. Moreover ZT0 and ~ZT0 are independent givenXT0 . We proceed
with the proof of the lemma by showing that the following inequality holds
I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 )  I(XT0 ; ~ZT0 ): (2.57)
Indeed, notice first that XT0 ! (ZT0 ; ~ZT0 ) ! eY T0 is a Markov chain, hence from
the data processing inequality we deduce that
I(XT0 ; eY T0 ) = I(XT0 ;ZT0 + ~ZT0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 ; ~ZT0 ): (2.58)
Consider now two partitions of 
,QZ = fAigN1i=1  FTZ andQ ~Z = fBjgN2j=1  FT~Z .
Define two discrete random variables D and ~D on 
 as follows D(!) = i if
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! 2 Ai and ~D(!) = j if ! 2 Bj . The mutual information I(XT0 ;ZT0 ; ~ZT0 ) can be
computed as [35]
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ;
~ZT0 ) = supQZ ;Q ~Z
I(XT0 ;D; ~D); (2.59)
where the supremum is taken over all such partitions of 
. We proceed to prove
(2.57) as follows
I(XT0 ;D; ~D)
(a)
= H(D; ~D) H(D; ~DjXT0 )
(b)
 H(D) +H( ~D) H(D; ~DjXT0 )
(c)
= H(D) +H( ~D) H(DjXT0 ) H( ~DjXT0 )
(d)
= I(D;XT0 ) + I( ~D;X
T
0 ); (2.60)
where (a) follows from Lemma 3 (Wyner’s lemma) applied to the random vari-
able (D; ~D), (d) is a also a direct instance of this lemma. The inequality (b) is the
independence bound on the entropy (which holds here since the random vari-
ables D and ~D are discrete). The equality (c) results from the fact that D and ~D
are conditionally independent given XT0 , indeed D 2 FTZ whereas ~D 2 FT~Z and
FTZ and FT~Z are conditionally independent given FTX . Consequently we have
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ;
~ZT0 ) = supQZ ;Q ~Z
I(XT0 ;D; ~D)
 sup
QZ ;Q ~Z
(I(XT0 ;D) + I(X
T
0 ; ~D))
= I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) + I(X
T
0 ; ~Z
T
0 ): (2.61)
Combining the last inequality with (2.58) we deduce that12
I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 )  I(XT0 ; ~ZT0 ): (2.62)
Now using Lemma 2 we have
I(XT0 ; ~Z
T
0 ) 
Z T
0
(E['(Xt)]  '(E[Xt]))dt; (2.63)
12Note that since E
R T
0
jXt lnXtj < 1, then I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) < 1 and hence the inequality is well
defined.
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where
'(x) = ((Ay   Az)x+ (Ay
Az
  1)z) ln((Ay   Az)x+ (Ay
Az
  1)z): (2.64)
Notice now that
'(x) = (
Ay
Az
  1)z(x) + (Ay
Az
  1) ln(Ay
Az
  1)(Azx+ z): (2.65)
Plugging this identity in the inequality above, the linear term in x disappears
and we are left with the inequality presented in the lemma.
An alternative proof of this lemma using the link provided in [27] between
the MMSE and the mutual information in Poisson channels is given in Section
2.7.2.
Theorem 3. If E
R T
0
jXt lnXtj <1, then
1
T
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 jZT0 )  Cs (2.66)
Proof. Combining (2.42) and the result of the two previous lemmas yields
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) 
Z T
0
(E[K(Xt)] K(E[Xt]))dt; (2.67)
whereK(x) = y(x)  z(x). A straightforward computation shows that
K 00(x) =
AzAy(Ay   Az)x+ zA2y   yA2z
(Ayx+ y)(Azx+ z)
; (2.68)
since Ay  Az and zA2y  yAyAz  yA2z we deduce thatK 00(x)  0. Moreover
due to the assumption that at least one of the inequalities (2.5) or (2.6) is strict,
we conclude thatK 00(x) > 0 (for x > 0) and K() is strictly convex.
33
Notice now that we have
1
T
Z T
0
(E[K(Xt)] K(E[Xt]))dt
(a)
 max
01
 
max
:
R 1
0 x(dx)=
Z 1
0
K(x)(dx) K()
!
(b)
= max
01
(K(1) + (1  )K(0) K()) ; (2.69)
where (a) follows from fixing E[Xt] =  and maximizing over all distributions
(x) on [0; 1]with mean . Equality (b) follows from the convexity ofK() (refer
to [16] and [37]), i.e., the maximizing distribution  puts all the mass on the
extremes f0; 1g and since the mean is , the maximizing  assigns the mass  to
1 and 1   to 0.
The maximization of the last term shows that the optimal  is the unique
solution to the equation
K 0() = K(1) K(0);
which, after some algebraic manipulations, gives that  is the solution to (2.11).
The existence of  follows simply from the mean value theorem, whereas the
uniqueness is a consequence of the strict monotonicity of K 0(x).
Consequently, the following is true
1
T
Z T
0
(E[K(Xt)] K(E[Xt]))dt
 K(1) + (1  )K(0) K()
= (Ay   Az) + ln
 

y
y
zz
!
+ ln

(Az
 + z)z
(Ay + y)y

: (2.70)
This fact when combined with (2.67) gives the result announced in the theorem.
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We are now in a position to prove the converse theorem.
Theorem 4 (Converse). If Rs is an achievable secrecy rate then Rs  Cs.
Proof. Since the secrecy rate Rs is achievable then for all 0 <  < 12 and suffi-
ciently large T , there exists an (M;T ) code such that lnM
T
 Rs   , Pe   and
1
T
I(U ;ZT0 )  . Hence we have
Rs  lnM
T
+ 
(a)
 1
T (1  Pe)
 
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 jZT0 ) + I(U ;ZT0 ) +H(Pe)

+ 
(b)
 1
1  Pe

Cs +
I(U ;ZT0 )
T
+
H(Pe)
T

+ 
(c)
 1
1  

Cs + +
H()
T

+ ; (2.71)
where inequality (a) follows from Lemma 4, inequality (b) from Theorem 3 and
inequality (c) from the properties of the code. Now since  is arbitrary, letting
! 0 yields Rs  Cs.
2.5 Rate-Equivocation region
In this section we turn our attention to the rate equivocation region of the de-
graded Poisson wiretap channel. The level of ignorance of the eavesdropper
about the transmitted message U will be measured here by the normalized
equivocation given by
T =
H(U jZT0 )
H(U)
: (2.72)
Definition A rate-equivocation pair (R; d) is said to be achievable for the Poisson
wiretap channel if for all  > 0 and all sufficiently large T , there exists an (M;T )
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code such that
lnM
T
 R  
Pe  
H(U jZT0 )
H(U)
 d   (2.73)
The following theorem gives the rate equivocation region (that is the set of
all achievable rate-equivocation pairs (R; d)) for the degraded Poisson Wiretap
channel.
Theorem 5. The rate-equivocation region is the set of all rate-equivocation pairs (R; d)
for which there exits some  2 [0; 1] such that
Rd   ln

(Ay + y)
Ay+y
(Az + z)Az+z

+ (1  ) ln
 

y
y
zz
!
  ln

(Ay + y)
Ay+y
(Az + z)Az+z

(2.74)
R   ln  (Ay + y)Ay+y+ (1  ) ln  yy   ln  (Ay + y)Ay+y (2.75)
d  1 (2.76)
To ease the notations, using the functions K() and y(), we can rewrite the
two first inequalities as Rd  K(1) + (1   )K(0)   K() and R  y(1) +
(1  )y(0)  y().
Proof. Themain ingredients needed to prove this theorem has been already used
to obtain the secrecy capacity. More specifically, for the achievability proof we
will use stochastic encoding combined with Wyner codes for the Poisson chan-
nel, and for the converse we will use the key inequality (2.67) established by
Lemma 6 and 7.
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2.5.1 Direct result
Note first that for a fixed rate R, if the rate equivocation pair (R; d) is achievable
then the pair (R; ~d) is achievable for all 0  ~d  d. Hence, in order to establish
the direct result, it is enough to prove that any rate-equivocation pair (R; d)
satisfying Rd = K(1) + (1 )K(0) K(), R  y(1) + (1 )y(0)  y()
and d  1 for some  2 [0; 1] is achievable.
Define
Ru = u(1) + (1  )u(0)  u(); u 2 fy; zg: (2.77)
Let  > 0 be arbitrary (small enough) and let R = Ry Rz R
d
with d  1 and
R  y(1) + (1  )y(0)  y(). The message U to be transmitted is selected
uniformly randomly from U = f1; :::;MgwithM = eRT . DefineMy = e(Ry 3R2 )T
and, following the steps described for the achievability of the secrecy capacity,
construct the Wyner code C = W(T;My; My). Partition this code arbitrarily
intoM smaller subcodes, i.e., C = [Mi=1Ci. The cardinality of each subcode Ci will
be equal toMz =
My
M
= e(Ry R 3
R
2
)T . Notice that with this choice of parameters
we have
1
T
lnMz = Ry  R  3R
2
 Ry  Rd  3R
2
= Rz   R
2
: (2.78)
The probability of error Pe of the legitimate receiver can be made less than 
because the Wyner code C can achieve the rate Ry.
The equivocation of the code C can be lower bounded using the same steps
used to established the upper bound on I(U ;ZT0 ) for the secrecy capacity, as
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follows
T =
H(U jZT0 )
H(U)
= 1  I(U ;Z
T
0 )
RT
(2.79)
(a)
 1  Rz
R
+
1
RT
lnMz   1
RT
(H() +  lnMz) (2.80)
= 1  Rz
R
+
Ry  R  3R2
R
  1
RT
(H() +  lnMz) (2.81)
 d  
2
  1
RT
H()  (Rz
R
  
2
): (2.82)
In the above, inequality (a) follows from (2.31) and  = 1
M
PM
m=1 m where m is
the probability of error for the code Cm (1  m M ) with the (optimal) decoder
described previously.
As was discussed before, the term 1
RT
H()+ (Rz
R
  
2
) can be made less than

2
for T large enough, which means that
T =
H(U jZT0 )
H(U)
 d  : (2.83)
This establishes that the rate-equivocation pair (R; d) is achievable.
2.5.2 Converse
For every (M;T ) code with rate RT = lnMT and equivocation T =
H(U jZT0 )
H(U)
we
have
TRTT = H(U jZT0 ) = H(U)  I(U ;ZT0 )
= H(U jY T0 ) + I(U ;Y T0 )  I(U ;ZT0 )
 H(U jU^) + I(U ;Y T0 jZT0 )
 H(Pe) + Pe lnM + I(XT0 ;Y T0 jZT0 ): (2.84)
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From Lemma 6 and 7 (cf. (2.67)) we have that
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 jZT0 ) 
Z T
0
(E[K(Xt)] K(E[Xt]))dt: (2.85)
Consequently, we deduce that
RTT  H(Pe) + Pe lnM
T
+
1
T
Z T
0
(E[K(Xt)] K(E[Xt]))dt (2.86)
 H(Pe) + Pe lnM
T
+ K(1) + (1  )K(0) K(); (2.87)
with  = 1
T
R T
0
E[Xt]dt and the last inequality follows from the convexity of the
function K(). Note that since 0  Xt  1 it follows that 0    1.
Similarly, we have that
RT =
H(U)
T
=
1
T
H(U jY T0 ) +
1
T
I(U ;Y T0 )
 1
T
H(U jU^) + 1
T
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )
(a)
 1
T
(H(Pe) + Pe lnM) +
1
T
Z T
0
(E[y(Xt)]  y(E[Xt]))dt
(b)
 H(Pe) + Pe lnM
T
+ y(1) + (1  )y(0)  y(); (2.88)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality and Lemma 2 and (b) follows from the
convexity of the function y().
Assume now that (R; d) is achievable, then for all 0 <  < 1
2
and all suffi-
ciently large T , there exists an (M;T ) code such that RT  R   , Pe   and
T  d . By definitionT  1, and hence d  1+ and in light of the previous
inequalities we have
(R  )(d  )  H() +  lnM
T
+ K(1) + (1  )K(0) K() (2.89)
(R  )  H() +  lnM
T
+ y(1) + (1  )y(0)  y(): (2.90)
Now since  is arbitrary, letting ! 0 yields the desired result.
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2.6 Conclusion and discussion
Motivated by the practical advantages of optical communication over RF for
secure communication, we have derived the secrecy capacity and characterized
the rate-equivocation region of the degraded Poisson wiretap channel.
Several interesting problems remain open and deserve further investigation.
One is the non-degraded Poisson Wiretap channel. One can imagine a situation
in which the eavesdropper is equipped with a powerful detector characterized
by a negligible dark current (i.e., z = 0). If the detector of the legitimate receiver
has a higher received power from the transmitter but is more prone to dark cur-
rent, then the channel will not be degraded. This is a practically-important sit-
uation but is not covered by our results. While the code construction used here
would certainly give an achievable secrecy rate, determining the secrecy capac-
ity is much more challenging in the non-degraded case. The difficulty is that,
unless the legitimate user’s channel is less noisy than the eavesdropper, finding
the secrecy capacity requires optimizing over an auxiliary random variable [49],
which complicates the analysis. One possible approach is to approximate the
Poisson channel by a binary DMC [18]. In principle, one could then apply the
classical result for the secrecy capacity of non-degraded DMCs [49] and take
limits. This procedure seems to be quite onerous, however.
Another issue that we have not addressed is fading. As mentioned in the
introduction, for wireless optical communications, atmospheric turbulence can
induce random fluctuations of the intensity of the transmitted light beam [24].
This impairment has received considerable attention in the context of reliable
communications, and it would be useful to determine its effect on secrecy.
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MIMO Poisson channels have received some interest lately (see [38] and the
references therein), and as has been done in the Gaussian setting, it would be
interesting to see the impact of havingmultiple antennas on the secrecy capacity
in the Poisson regime.
We believe that the results derived in this chapter and the tools used to de-
rive them could be used to address these problems.
2.7 Alternative Proofs
2.7.1 An MMSE Proof for Lemma 6
We provide here an alternative proof for Lemma 6. This proof uses the
link established in [27] between the MMSE and the mutual information in
Poisson channels. Note first that since E
R T
0
jXt lnXtj < 1, we have that
I(XT0 ;PT0 (AyXT0 + )) is differentiable and Theorem 3 in [27] states that
d
d
I(XT0 ;PT0 (AyXT0 + )) =Z T
0
Efln(AyXt + )  lnhAyXt + iTgdt: (2.91)
Notice now that
I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  I(XT0 ;Y T0 ) =Z y+~
y
d
d
I(XT0 ;PT0 (AyXT0 + ))d: (2.92)
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Therefore
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ; eY T0 ) =Z y+~
y
Z T
0
(EflnhAyXt + iTg Efln(AyXt + )g)dt

d: (2.93)
Since the function ln() is concave, using Jensen’s inequality and the iterative
conditioning property we have
EflnhAyXt + iTg  lnE[hAyXt + iT ] = ln(AyE[Xt] + ):
Making use of this inequality and the fact that y + ~ =
Ay
Az
z we deduce that
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ; eY T0 ) Z T
0
 Z Ay
Az
z
y
ln(AyE[Xt] + )d Ef
Z Ay
Az
z
y
ln(AyXt + )dg
!
dt; (2.94)
where we have also invoked Fubini’s theorem to make the necessary exchanges
between the integrals and the expectation operator. The desired inequality is
then obtained after some algebraic manipulations using the elementary identityZ
ln(Ayx+ )d = (Ayx+ ) ln(Ayx+ )  : (2.95)
2.7.2 An MMSE Proof for Lemma 7
Here we provide an alternative proof for Lemma 7. For ease of notations define
Wt = AyXt +
Ay
Az
z. Using Theorem 4 in [27] we obtain that
d
d
I(W T0 ;PT0 (W T0 )) =
Z T
0
E[Wt ln(Wt)]dt
 
Z T
0
E[E[WtjPT0 (W T0 )] ln(E[WtjPT0 (W T0 )])]dt
=
Z T
0
E[Wt lnWt]dt
 
Z T
0
E[E[WtjPT0 (W T0 )] ln(E[WtjPT0 (W T0 )])]dt; (2.96)
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where the second equality is obtained after some simplifications using the
identity E[E[WtjPT0 (W T0 )]] = E[Wt]. Now by the convexity of the function
C(x) = x ln(x), Jensen’s inequality gives
E[C(E[WtjPT0 (W T0 )])]  C(E[E[WtjPT0 (W T0 )]])
= C(E[Wt]): (2.97)
It follows therefore that
d
d
I(W T0 ;PT0 (W T0 )) 
Z T
0
E[Wt lnWt]dt 
Z T
0
E[Wt] lnE[Wt]dt: (2.98)
Clearly we have that I(W T0 ;PT0 (W T0 )) = I(XT0 ;PT0 (W T0 )). Also we have thateY T0 = PT0 (W T0 ) and ZT0 = PT0 (AzAyW T0 ). Consequently
I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) = Z 1
Az
Ay
d
d
I(W T0 ;PT0 (W T0 ))d: (2.99)
Using the previous inequality, we conclude that
I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 )  Z 1
Az
Ay
Z T
0
E[Wt lnWt]dt 
Z T
0
E[Wt] lnE[Wt]dt

d
= (1  Az
Ay
)
Z T
0
E[(AyXt +
Ay
Az
z) ln(AyXt +
Ay
Az
z)]dt
 
Z T
0
(AyE[Xt] +
Ay
Az
z) ln(AyE[Xt] +
Ay
Az
z)dt

:
(2.100)
After some simplifications, the last inequality gives the desired result, i.e.,
I(XT0 ; eY T0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 )  (AyAz   1)
Z T
0
(E[z(Xt)]  z(E[Xt])) dt: (2.101)
43
CHAPTER 3
SECRECY CAPACITY OF THE EXPONENTIAL SERVER QUEUE
3.1 Introduction
The problem that we consider is depicted in Figure 3.1. The encoder (Bob), en-
codes a message U by using a given sequence of packet inter-arrival times rep-
resented here by the arrival processXT0 = (Xt; 0  t  T ). These packets are fed
into two different =M=1 queues. The legitimate decoder (Alice) observes the de-
parture process Y T0 of the packets from the main queue which has a service rate
1. Similarly, the eavesdropper (Eve) observes the departure process ZT0 from
the second queue with a service rate 2. Our goal is to find the secrecy capacity
for this model, that is the maximum rate at which Bob can send information to
Alice while still keeping the information leakage to Eve arbitrarily close to zero.
When 1  2, clearly the secrecy capacity is zero as the distortion affecting the
packet arrival times is less severe for the eavesdropper. The interesting scenario
is then when 2 < 1. The exact same problem represented in Figure 3.1 was
studied in [42] and partial results are available. When 2 < 1e , Dunn et. al.
showed that the secrecy capacity is maximum and is equal to 1
e
, which is the
capacity of the main queue. This can be achieved by choosing for input XT0 a
Poisson process with rate 1
e
. Doing so simultaneously achieves the capacity
over the main queue and overloads the eavesdropper queue thereby making
the output process ZT0 behave asymptotically like a Poisson process with rate 2
that is independent of the input XT0 . Dunn et. al. demonstrated also that when
1
e
 2 < 1, the rate 2 log

1
2

can be achieved in secrecy. The main result
of this chapter is to show that this quantity is indeed the secrecy capacity for
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1
e
 2 < 1.
Figure 3.1: The wiretap exponential server timing channel.
To show the converse, we first prove that when 2 < 1, the eavesdropper’s
channel is stochastically degraded with respect to that of the legitimate receiver.
That is we can assume that the Markov chain XT0 ! Y T0 ! ZT0 holds. We estab-
lish this by constructing an additional queue which takes as input the process
Y T0 and degrades it into the process ZT0 . We show moreover that this result
holds regardless of whether the queues start initially empty or in equilibrium.
Using this and invoking the data processing inequality for relative entropy we
obtain D(Y1 jjY2 )  D(Z1 jjZ2 ) where Y1 (dy) and Y2 (dy) (respectively Z1 (dz)
and Z2 (dz)) are probability measures on the space of departure processes from
the main queue (respectively the eavesdropper queue) induced respectively by
1(dx) and 2(dx) which are in turn probability measure on the space of arrival
processes. If the queues are initially in equilibrium and we choose for 2(dx)
the probability measure P(dx) corresponding to a Poisson process with rate
 < 2, then Burke’s theorem [45] implies that Y2 = Z2 = P which gives
D(Y1 jjP)  D(Z1 jjP). We show that this inequality combined with other in-
termediate results is enough to establish the converse.
We believe that the inequality
D(Y1 jjP)  D(Z1 jjP) (3.1)
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is in itself an interesting result. Prabhakar and Gallager [43, Theorem 1] showed
that if A = fAn; n 2 Zg is a sequence of i.i.d. inter-arrival times of packets with
E[A1] =
1

that are fed into a =Geom=1 queue with mean service time 1

(with
 < ), then the corresponding process of inter-departure times D = fDn; n 2
Zg has an entropy rate that is no less than that of the processA. Moreover they
demonstrated [43, Corollary 2] that if G = fGn; n 2 Zg is an i.i.d. sequence
of geometric random variables with mean 1

, then by letting DER(AjjG) be the
relative entropy rate between the processesA andG, we have
DER(AjjG)  DER(DjjG): (3.2)
They showed that Burke’s theorem for the =Geom=1 queue (which is the dis-
crete time analog of the Poisson-in-Poisson-out property of the =M=1 queue)
follows from this inequality. As mentioned by Anantharam and Verdu´ in [44],
(3.2) can itself be established by using the discrete-time analog of Burke’s the-
orem combined with the data processing inequality for relative entropy. The
inequality that we establish here (3.1) can be seen as some sort of generaliza-
tion of (3.2) for continuous time queues. However the novelty of (3.1) reside in
the fact that it links relative entropies of the outputs of two different queues,
whereas (3.2) is an inequality about the relative entropy between the input and
output of one single queue.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we go over
some mathematical facts that will be used throughout the chapter. In Section
3.3, we present the main result of the chapter which is the secrecy capacity of
the exponential server queue. In Section 3.4, we digress a little to talk about
the achievability part of the main result. The converse part, which is our main
contribution, is provided in Section 3.5.
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3.2 Mathematical Prelude
In this section we will introduce some of the notation that will be used in this
chapter. We will also recall some important facts and technical details that will
serve as the main tools to prove the upcoming results. Most of the facts con-
tained in this section can be found in [46]-[54]. They are reproduced here for the
convenience of the reader.
3.2.1 Notation
For a given T 2 (0;1), we will use XT0 to denote (Xt : t 2 [0; T ]). For t 2 [0; T ],
FXt = (Xs : s 2 [0; t]) is the internal history of the stochastic process X up to
and including time t. For t 2 (0; T ], we use FXt  = (Xs : s 2 [0; t)) to denote the
strict past at time t of the stochastic process X . We will also use Xt  to denote
the left limit of X at the time t, i.e., Xt  = lims"tXs. A stochastic process X will
be left-continuous if Xt  = Xt almost surely.
A process X is said to be adapted to the filtration (Ft : t 2 [0; T ]) if Xt is Ft-
measurable for all t 2 [0; T ]. A process X is said to be predictable with respect
to the filtration (Ft : t 2 [0; T ]) ifX can be written as the limit of left-continuous
adapted processes. A more general definition for predictable processes can be
found in [48, p. 8]. But for all practical purposes the definition given here is
sufficient.
The input space considered here is the set of nondecreasing and right-
continuous integer valued functions and will be denoted by XT . That is, x 2 XT
if: (1) xt 2 N for all t, (2) xt = lims#t xs and (3) xt1  xt2 for t1  t2. The space
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XT represents the set of arrival processes and xt will track the number of pack-
ets arrived to the queue in the interval [0; t]. Note that this definition does not
exclude having multiple arrivals at a given moment.
The output space is denoted by DT . This space is the set of all functions wt
on [0; T ] that are nondecreasing, right-continuous, have unit jumps and satisfy
w0 = 0. By unit jumps we mean that wt = wt   wt  2 f0; 1g. The set DT will
represent the set of departure processes from the queue that can be observed by
the decoder. Therefore wt is the number of packets that have departed from the
queue in the interval [0; t].
3.2.2 Stochastic Intensity of Point Processes
The notion of stochastic intensity of point processes is crucial to the rest of this
chapter. To define it, we start with a probability space (
;F ; P ) and a filtration
(Ft : t  0) on this space. The definition of stochastic intensity is the following.
Definition Let N be a point process (i.e., N is nondecreasing, right-continuous,
have unit jumps and satisfyN0 = 0) that is adapted to Ft and let t be a nonneg-
ative process that is Ft-predictable. The process Nt is said to have the (P;Ft)-
intensity t if the following is true1
 For all t  0 Z t
0
sds <1 P   a:s: (3.3)
1The general definition of a stochastic intensity of a point process requires only for t to be
nonnegative and Ft-progressive [48, p. 27]. However, this generality is not needed here as one
can always find a predictable version of the intensity [48, p. 31].
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 For all nonnegative Ft-predictable processes Ct, we have
E
Z 1
0
CtdNt

= E
Z 1
0
Cttdt

: (3.4)
If the last jump of Nt occurs before time T , then (3.4) is equivalent to
E
hR T
0
CtdNt
i
= E
hR T
0
Cttdt
i
. Indeed in this case dNt = 0 for t > T , which
means that E
R1
0
CtdNt

= E
hR T
0
CtdNt
i
. Moreover by choosing Ct = 1ft>Tg
in (3.4), we will have 0 = E
R1
T
tdt

, which by the nonnegativity of the in-
tensity implies that t = 0 for t > T almost surely. This in turn gives that
E
R1
0
Cttdt

= E
hR T
0
Cttdt
i
.
The following are two results pertaining to stochastic intensities that will be
used later in the chapter. The first fact can be found in [48, p. 27] and the second
one in [48, p. 28].
Fact 1: Let Nt be a point process with Ft-intensity t. If FNt  Gt  Ft for
t  0 and t is Gt-predictable, then t is also the Gt-intensity of Nt.
Fact 2: Let Nt be a point process with Ft-intensity t. If Gt is a filtration such
that G1 is independent of Ft for all t  0. Then t is also the Gt _Ft-intensity of
Nt, where Gt _ Ft = (Gt [ Ft).
Throughout this chapter, the notation P will be reserved to the probability
measure on (DT ;FNT ) that makes Nt a point process with a constant intensity 
with respect to FNt . That is on (DT ;FNT ; P), the point processN is Poisson with
rate . The probability measure P1 will be used as the reference measure in this
chapter.
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3.2.3 Channel Model
We describe in this section the transition probability from XT to DT that we use
to capture the dynamics of the channel of the legitimate receiver and that of the
eavesdropper. For the sake of brevity, some technical details will be omitted.
For a more complete exposition, the interested reader is referred to [46]-[54].
Recall that the channels of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are both
exponential server timing channels (i.e., =M=1 queues) with respective service
rates 1 and 2 and that the assumption here is that both of these queues are
initially empty.
For a fixed arrival process x 2 XT , the number of packets at time t in the
main queue is given by
Q
(1)
t = xt   Yt for t 2 [0; T ]; (3.5)
where Yt is the number of departures seen by the legitimate party in the interval
[0; t]. To model the dynamics of this queue, we would like to find a proba-
bility measure P (1)x (dy) on (DT ;FYT ) such that the point process Yt admits the
(P
(1)
x ;FYt )-intensity

(1)
t = 1I(Q
(1)
t  > 0) for t 2 (0; T ]: (3.6)
As described in [46] and [54], this can be accomplished by defining P (1)x (dy) via
the following Radon-Nikodym derivative
dP
(1)
x
dP1
(y) = L(1)x (y); (3.7)
where
L(1)x (y) = exp
Z T
0
[log(
(1)
t )dyt + (1  (1)t )dt]

: (3.8)
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To model the channel of the eavesdropper we follow a similar procedure.
Namely, Q(2)t = xt   Zt will be the size of the eavesdropper’s queue at time t
and Zt will be the number of packets that have departed from this queue by
time t. The channel transition probability will be P (2)x (dz) and is defined by
dP
(2)
x
dP1
(z) = L(2)x (z) = exp
Z T
0
[log(
(2)
t )dzt + (1  (2)t )dt]

; (3.9)
where

(2)
t = 2I(Q
(2)
t  > 0) for t 2 (0; T ]: (3.10)
3.2.4 Mutual Information
A probability measure  on the space (XT ;FXT ) combined with the channel
transition probability P (1)x (dy) given above will induce a probability measure
(1)(dy) on (DT ;FYT ). It can be verified that (1)(dy) has the following Radon-
Nikodym derivative with respect to P1(dy)
d(1)
dP1
(y) = exp
Z T
0
[log(b(1)t )dyt + (1  b(1)t )dt] ; (3.11)
where
b(1)t = E[(1)t jFYt ]: (3.12)
Consequently, it can be shown that the normalizedmutual information between
an arrival processXT0 and the corresponding departure process Y T0 observed by
the legitimate receiver can be written under the following form
1
T
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 ) =
1
T
E
Z T
0
((
(1)
t )  (b(1)t ))dt ; (3.13)
where (x) = x ln(x) and (0) = 0. For the eavesdropper, similar objects can be
defined analogously. Namely, (2)(dz) will be the induced probability measure
on (DT ;FZT ) and b(2)t = E[(2)t jFZt ].
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3.3 Main result
We proceed to the description of the main result of this chapter. We start with
the information transmission aspect of the problem.
3.3.1 Encoding-Decoding
The transmitter wishes to communicate a message U uniformly distributed on
U = f1; :::;Mg. An (n;M; T ) code is constructed by mapping each message to
an element x 2 XT having n arrivals over the interval [0; T ]. The rate of this code
will be R = lnM
T
. The encoding procedure could eventually be a stochastic one,
the only restriction that we impose on the encoder is that the expected number
of packets left in the main queue (averaged over the code-book and the queue
distribution) at time T is no more than 1. This constraint will guarantee that
the input rate and the output rate of the queue are asymptotically the same.
The decoder after observing the departures during [0; T ] declares one of the M
messages as transmitted. Note that since all the arrivals occur in the interval
[0; T ], the departure process over [0; T ] is a sufficient statistic for deciding which
message has been transmitted. The average probability of error of this code at
the legitimate receiver will be denoted by Per and the level of secrecy will be
measured by 1
T
I(U ;ZT0 ).
Secrecy rates: A secrecy rate Rs is said to be achievable for this wiretap channel
if for all  > 0 there exists a sequence of (n;M; T ) codes with T ! 1 such that
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eventually we will have
1
T
lnM  Rs    (3.14)
Per   (3.15)
1
T
I(U ;ZT0 )   (3.16)
A secrecy rate Rs is said to be achievable at output rate  if it is achievable using
a sequence of (n;M; Tn) codes with
lim
n!1
Tn
n
=
1

: (3.17)
Secrecy Capacity: The supremum of achievable secrecy rates will be called the
secrecy capacity and will be denoted by Cs. The supremum of achievable secrecy
rates at output rate  will be denoted by Cs().
From the above definitions, it can be verified that
Cs = sup
<1
Cs(): (3.18)
3.3.2 Main result
The main result of this chapter is the characterization of the secrecy capacity Cs.
Clearly, when 1  2, the secrecy capacity is zero. Moreover, when 2 < 1e , it
was shown in [42] that in this case the secrecy capacity is equal to the capacity
of the main queue, i.e.,
Cs =
1
e
: (3.19)
Throughout the rest of the chapter we will assume therefore that the condition
1
e
 2 < 1 is satisfied. Themain result of the chapter is the following theorem.
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Theorem 6. The secrecy capacity for 1
e
 2 < 1 is given by
Cs = 2 log
1
2
: (3.20)
The main contribution of the present chapter is proving the converse part,
i.e., Cs  2 log 12 . The achievability part of the theorem was established in [42].
For the sake of completeness we will provide below a proof of the achievability
of the rate 2 log

1
2

using the point process channel model that we are using
in this chapter.
3.4 Achievability of the rate 2 log

1
2

To prove that the rate 2 log

1
2

is achievable in secrecy, we need to show that
the probability of error on the main channel and the information leakage to the
eavesdropper can be both made arbitrary small. By choosing Poisson processes
with intensity 2 as codewords, it can be shown [46] that the rate 2 log

1
2

can
be achieved reliably over the main channel. It remains to verify that the secrecy
constraint is satisfied as well. The following lemma shows that in order to sat-
isfy the secrecy constraint it suffices to overload the queue of the eavesdropper
by choosing   2. As concluded in [42], what this shows is that stochastic
encoding is not required to confuse the eavesdropper.
Lemma 8. For   2, we have
lim
T!1
1
T
I(U ;ZT0 ) = 0: (3.21)
Proof. Since the mutual information is always non negative, we clearly have
limT!1 1T I(U ;Z
T
0 )  0 and we only need to show the reverse inequality. Ap-
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plying the data processing inequality on the Markov chain U $ XT0 $ ZT0 , we
have
I(U ;ZT0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 ): (3.22)
So to prove the lemma it suffices to show that
lim
T!1
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 )  0: (3.23)
As seen in Section 3.2, the mutual information between XT0 and ZT0 can be ex-
pressed via the following formula,
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) =
1
T
E
Z T
0
((
(2)
t )  (b(2)t ))dt : (3.24)
Using Jensen’s inequality combined with Fubini’s theoremwe can upper bound
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) as follows
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) 
1
T
Z T
0
E[(
(2)
t )]dt  

1
T
Z T
0
E[b(2)t ]dt : (3.25)
Since E[b(2)t ] = E[(2)t ], the last inequality becomes
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) 
1
T
Z T
0
E[(
(2)
t )]dt  

1
T
Z T
0
E[
(2)
t ]dt

: (3.26)
Note that
(
(2)
t ) = 2I(Q
(2)
t  > 0) ln(2I(Q
(2)
t  > 0))
= 2 ln(2)I(Q
(2)
t  > 0) + 2I(Q
(2)
t  > 0) ln(I(Q
(2)
t  > 0))
= (2)I(Q
(2)
t  > 0) + 2(I(Q
(2)
t  > 0))
= (2)I(Q
(2)
t  > 0); (3.27)
where in the last equality we used the fact (1) = (0) = 0. It follows therefore
that
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 ) 
(2)
T
Z T
0
P (Q
(2)
t  > 0)dt  

2
T
Z T
0
P (Q
(2)
t  > 0)dt

: (3.28)
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If the input rate is such that   2, the eavesdropper’s queue will be unstable
and for sufficiently large t we will have P (Q(2)t  > 0) = 1. This implies
lim
T!1
1
T
Z T
0
P (Q
(2)
t  > 0)dt = 1: (3.29)
The function () being continuous it follows that
lim
T!1
1
T
I(XT0 ;Z
T
0 )  (2)  (2) = 0: (3.30)
This completes the proof of the achievability.
3.5 Converse
3.5.1 Preliminaries
We start this section with the following simple lemma.
Lemma 9. When 2   < 1, the secrecy capacity at output rate  is upper-bounded
as follows
Cs()  2 log

1
2

: (3.31)
Proof. It is known that the capacity of the main channel at output rate  < 1 is
[41],[46]
C() =  log
1


: (3.32)
As the secrecy capacity can never exceed the capacity of the main channel, a
trivial upper bound on Cs() is then
Cs()  C() =  log
1


: (3.33)
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Now, note that
d
d
C() = log
1
e

: (3.34)
Recalling the assumption 1
e
 2, we see that if 2  , we have
Cs()  C()  C(2) = 2 log

1
2

for 2   < 1; (3.35)
which is the result of the lemma.
To establish the converse, we need to show that the inequality provided in
Lemma 9 holds also for  < 2. We will in fact establish a tighter inequality
given in the following theorem.
Theorem 7. When  < 2, the secrecy capacity with output rate  is upper-bounded
by
Cs()   log

1
2

: (3.36)
By combining the inequality in this theorem and the one given in the previ-
ous lemma we have
Cs = sup
<1
Cs()  2 log

1
2

; (3.37)
which establishes the converse andwhen combinedwith the achievability result
proves Theorem 6. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to the proof of Theorem
7. Therefore, we are going to assume that  < 2. To prove Theorem 7, we
will need several intermediate results. The first one, given in the lemma below,
shows that the secrecy capacity when the queues are initially in equilibrium is
an upper bound on the secrecy capacity when the queues are initially empty.
Analyzing queuing systems is often easier when the queues are in equilibrium.
The problem treated in this chapter is not an exception to this rule.
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Lemma 10. If a rate Rs is achievable with secrecy at output rate  when the queues are
initially empty then Rs is also achievable with secrecy when the queues start initially in
equilibrium (with respect to a Poisson process with rate ).
Proof. Let Cn = (n;M; Tn) be a sequence of codes that achieve the secrecy rateRs
at output rate when the queues are initially empty. Wewould like to transform
this sequence into another sequence of codes that can be used to communicate
reliably and in secrecy when the queues start in equilibrium. In order to do
that, we can imagine that at time zero, the encoder injects a synchronization
packet (labeled packet 0) that bears a special mark. After observing the depar-
ture of packet 0 from the queue, the decoder will know that all the initial packets
present in the queue have already departed. Consequently, all subsequent de-
parting packets belong to the codeword sent by the encoder. Now let (n)n be
a sequence of positive numbers satisfying the following two conditions
lim
n!1
n = 0; (3.38)
and
lim
n!1
nTn =1: (3.39)
We define a new sequence of codes that we shall call Ceqn that is obtained from Cn
by the following transformation. For every codeword in Cn, we shift the arrival
times of its n packets by nTn and then add the special packet 0 that will arrive
to the queue at time 0. We will show that the sequence of codes Ceqn achieves the
secrecy rate Rs when the queues start initially in equilibrium. From (3.38), we
note that Cn and Ceqn will have asymptotically the same rate. Indeed,
Rate of Cn
Rate of Ceqn
= 1 +n ! 0 as n!1: (3.40)
LetD0 be the departure time of packet 0 from themain queue. The same decoder
used for Cn is used again for Ceqn with one modification; if D0 > nTn, the entire
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codeword is declared in error. The probability of error of this decoder can be
bounded as follows
Probability of Error  P [D0 > nTn] + P [Decoding errorjD0  nTn]: (3.41)
The term P [D0 > nTn] in (3.41) can be computed explicitly [41]
P [D0 > nTn] = exp( (1   )nTn): (3.42)
Since  < 2 < 1, this term converges to zero exponentially fast (cf. (3.39)).
Given D0  nTn, since all the packets of the codeword were delayed by nTn,
the first arriving packet finds the queue of the legitimate receiver empty. Hence,
since Cn has a vanishing error probability, P [Decoding errorjD0  nTn] con-
verges to 0. We conclude therefore that Ceqn can be used to communicate reliably
over the main queue.
To finish the proof of the lemma, it remains to verify that the sequence of
codes (Ceqn )n has a vanishing information leakage rate to the eavesdropper. This,
however, simply follows from the fact that the sequence of codes (Cn)n has a
vanishing information leakage rate and that the initial number of packets in the
eavesdropper’s queue can only decrease the dependence between the transmit-
ted message and the departure process from this queue.
3.5.2 Degradation Lemma and consequences
Here we shall prove one of the key lemmas required to establish the converse.
This lemma is stated below.
Lemma 11. When 2 < 1 and the queues start at time zero in equilibrium with
respect to a Poisson process with rate   0, the eavesdropper’s channel is stochastically
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degraded with respect to the legitimate receiver’s channel.
Note that the case  = 0 corresponds to the situation where the queues start
empty at time zero. That is this lemma holds regardless of whether the queues
start empty or in equilibrium. To prove this lemma, we will show that we can
emulate an exponential server timing channel with parameter 2 (i.e., the depar-
ture process ZT0 ) by degrading the observation of the legitimate receiver (i.e., the
departure process Y T0 ) with some operations that are independent of the trans-
mitted codeword (i.e., the arrival process XT0 ). This result allow us to assume
that the Markov chain
XT0 ! Y T0 ! ZT0
holds. Before proving this lemma, we will pause for a moment and go over
two consequences of this Markov chain. The first byproduct is the following
inequality.
Lemma 12. For every (n;M; T )-code with rate R = lnM
T
, we have
R  1
T (1  Per)(I(X
T
0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) + I(U ;ZT0 ) +H(Per)); (3.43)
where H(Per)) =  Per log(Per)  (1  Per) log(1  Per) is the binary entropy.
The proof of this lemma can be found in the previous chapter. The second
consequence of the degradedness is the well know data processing inequality
for relative entropy. To present this inequality in the context studied in this
chapter, we need to introduce some further notation. Let 1(dx) and 2(dx) be
two probability measures on the space of arrival processes (XT ;FXT ). Let Y1 (dy)
and Y2 (dy) be the induced probability measures on the space of departure pro-
cesses from the legitimate queue (DT ;FYT ). These two measures are absolutely
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continuouswith respect to P(dy) and hence admit Radon-Nikodymderivatives
pY1 (y) and pY2 (y) with respect to P(dy), i.e.,
pYi (y) =
Yi (dy)
P(dy)
i = 1; 2: (3.44)
The relative entropy between Y1 and Y2 is then defined as follows
D(Y1 jjY2 ) =
Z
pY1 (y) log

pY1 (y)
pY2 (y)

P(dy): (3.45)
We define similarly D(Z1 jjZ2 ), where Z1 (dz) and Z2 (dz) are probability mea-
sures on the space of departure processes from the eavesdropper queue
(DT ;FZT ), induced respectively by 1(dx) and 2(dx). An immediate conse-
quence of the Markov chain XT0 ! Y T0 ! ZT0 is the data processing theorem
for relative entropies stated as follows.
Lemma 13 (Data Processing Inequality).
D(Y1 jjY2 )  D(Z1 jjZ2 ): (3.46)
The proof of this inequality can be found for instance in [49]. We shall use
this inequality combined with another well know theorem, but this time not in
information theory but rather in queueing theory, Burke’s theorem. More on
this will come later. We present now the proof of the degradedness. Since this
lemma is central to the results of this chapter and not all readers of this thesis
are familiar with the stochastic intensity theory of point process, we present in
Section 3.6 a different proof that we believe will be more appealing to those
readers.
Proof of Lemma 11. Assume that at time zero the queues start in equilibriumwith
respect to a Poisson process with rate . In this case, the distribution of the
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queue size at time zero Q(1)0 for the legitimate receiver and Q
(2)
0 for the eaves-
dropper is given by
P [Q
(i)
0 = k] = (1  i)ki ; k  0; i = 1; 2: (3.47)
where i = i . The case  = 0 corresponds to the situation where the queues
start empty since P [Q(1)0 = 0] = P [Q
(2)
0 = 0] = 1 when  = 0. Now, let eQ0 be a
mixed geometric random variable (independent of all other random variables)
defined as follows
P [ eQ0 = k] =
8><>: , if k = 0(1  )(1  2)k 12 , if k  1.
where
 =
1  2
1  1 : (3.48)
The random variable eQ0 has been chosen so that
Q
(2)
0
d
= Q
(1)
0 + eQ0: (3.49)
This can be easily verified by means of probability generating functions as fol-
lows
E
h
zQ
(1)
0 +
eQ0i = E hzQ(1)0 iE hz eQ0i = 1  1
1  1z ( + (1  )z
1  2
1  2z )
=
1  2
1  1z (1 +
(2   1)z
1  2z )
=
1  2
1  2z = E
h
zQ
(2)
0
i
: (3.50)
As said above, the ESTCwith parameter 2 will be constructed by degrading the
departure process of an ESTC with parameter 1 (with 1 > 2). The degrading
procedure that we use requires an extra ESTC with parameter 2, we will call
this queue the degrading queue. At time zero, this queue will start with eQ0
packets and we let eQt be the number of packets in this queue at time t. The
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input to this queue will be a thinned version of the departure process of the
legitimate queue (i.e., Y T0 ). The thinning operation depends however on the
state of the degrading queue eQt. This thinning operation works as follows; if a
departure from the legitimate queue occurs at time t (i.e., Yt = Yt   Yt  = 1)
then
 If eQt  > 0, the packet enters the degrading queue.
 If eQt  = 0,
– With probability 2
1
the packet does not enter the degrading queue
and leaves immediately the system.
– With probability 1  2
1
the packet enters the degrading queue.
We define eZt to be the output of this system. In other words, eZt is the point pro-
cess that counts the number of packets in the two streams: the steam of depar-
tures from the degrading queue (that we shall denote by Vt) plus the stream of
packets that left the system immediately without entering the degrading queue
(denoted by Ut). We define Qt = eQt + Q(1)t to be the total number of packets at
time t in the system (i.e., in both queues). We will prove that this system be-
haves as an ESTC with service rate 2 by showing that the departure processeZT0 from this system admits the FQt -intensity 2I(Qt  > 0). Since we also have
that Q0
d
= Q
(2)
0 and eZT0 is constructed using only Y T0 and the state of the degrad-
ing queue eQ (which depends on XT0 only through Y T0 ), this will be sufficient to
prove the lemma.
In the following, we let dn be the nth jump time of Yt, i.e.,
Yt =
X
n
I(dn  t); (3.51)
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where I(dn  t) is equal to 1 if dn  t and is equal to 0 otherwise. On the
same probability space we define a sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables
(Bn; n = 1; 2; :::) such that
P [Bn = 0] = 1  P [Bn = 1] = 2
1
: (3.52)
This sequence will be taken to be independent of all other random variables and
we let FB1 = (B1; B2; :::). On the same probability space we consider also an
independent Poisson process Nt with FNt -intensity 2 and we let kn be the nth
jump time of Nt, i.e.,
Nt =
X
n
I(kn  t): (3.53)
Now define
Ft = ( eQ0) _ (Q(1)0 ) _ FXt _ FYt _ FNt _ FB1: (3.54)
From Fact 2 in Section 3.2, we can see that the Ft-intensity of Nt is also 2. This
is because FNt is independent of ( eQ0) _ (Q(1)0 ) _ FX1 _ FY1 _ FB1. For similar
reasons, the Ft-intensity of Yt is 1I(Q(1)t  > 0).
The number of packets at time t in the degraded queue can be written as
eQt = eQ0 + eYt   Vt (3.55)
The process Vt represents the number of packets at time t that departed from the
degrading queue. The process Vt can be constructed from the points of Nt as
Vt =
X
n
I( eQkn  > 0)I(kn  t): (3.56)
The process eYt represents the number of packets that entered the degrading
queue at time t. Using the sequence of Benoulli randomvariables defined above,
we can represent this process as follows
eYt =X
n
(BnI( eQdn  = 0) + I( eQdn  > 0))I(dn  t): (3.57)
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Now let Ut represent the number of packets at time t that left the systemwithout
receiving any service in the degrading queue, i.e.,
Ut =
X
n
(1 Bn)I( eQdn  = 0)I(dn  t): (3.58)
As one should expect, we must have
Yt = eYt + Ut: (3.59)
The output of the system eZt is then obtained by combined the two streams, i.e.,
eZt = Ut + Vt: (3.60)
Observe that Ut represents the common points of the process Yt and eZt, i.e.,
Ut =
X
0<st
Ys eZs: (3.61)
We define now Gt = FQ(1)t _ F
eQ
t and we start by computing the Gt-intensity of
Ut. Let Ct be Gt-predictable, from the definition of Ut we have
E
Z 1
0
CsdUs

=
X
n
E[(1 Bn)CdnI( eQdn  = 0)I(dn <1)]: (3.62)
Observe that CdnI( eQdn  = 0)I(dn <1) is Gdn -measurable and that Bn is inde-
pendent of Gdn . Consequently, we have
E[(1 Bn)CdnI( eQdn  = 0)I(dn <1)] =
E[E[(1 Bn)CdnI( eQdn  = 0)I(dn <1)jGdn ]] =
E[CdnI( eQdn  = 0)I(dn <1)E[(1 Bn)jGdn ]] =
E[CdnI( eQdn  = 0)I(dn <1)E[(1 Bn)]] =
2
1
E[CdnI( eQdn  = 0)I(dn <1)]: (3.63)
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It follows that
E
Z 1
0
CsdUs

=
2
1
X
n
E[CdnI( eQdn  = 0)I(dn <1)]
=
2
1
E
Z 1
0
CsI( eQs  = 0)dYs : (3.64)
The process (CtI( eQt  = 0))t>0 is Gt-predictable, since Gt  Ft, this process is
also Ft-predictable. Recall that the Ft-intensity of Yt is 1I(Q(1)t  > 0), therefore
E
Z 1
0
CsdUs

=
2
1
E
Z 1
0
CsI( eQs  = 0)dYs
= 2E
Z 1
0
CsI( eQs  = 0)I(Q(1)s  > 0)ds : (3.65)
The process (2I( eQt  = 0)I(Q(1)t  > 0))t>0 being Gt-predictable we deduce that it
is the Gt-intensity of Ut.
We move now to the Gt-intensity of Vt, from the definition of Vt we have
E
Z 1
0
CsdVs

= E
Z 1
0
CsI( eQs  > 0)dNs : (3.66)
The process (CtI( eQt  > 0))t>0 is Gt-predictable, since Gt  Ft, this process is
also Ft-predictable. Recall that the Ft-intensity of Nt is 2, we deduce therefore
that
E
Z 1
0
CsdVs

= 2E
Z 1
0
CsI( eQs  > 0)ds : (3.67)
Since (2I( eQt  > 0))t>0 is Gt-predictable, it must be the Gt-intensity of Vt.
Now recalling that eZt = Ut + Vt, we conclude that the Gt-intensity of eZt is
2[I( eQt  > 0) + I( eQt  = 0)I(Q(1)t  > 0)]. This intensity can be also written as
2I(Qt  > 0). This can be verified easily through the enumeration of all the
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possible cases or by the following
I(Qt  > 0) = I(Q
(1)
t  + eQt  > 0)
= 1  I(Q(1)t  + eQt  = 0)
= 1  I(Q(1)t  = 0)I( eQt  = 0)
= I( eQt  > 0) + I( eQt  = 0)  I(Q(1)t  = 0)I( eQt  = 0)
= I( eQt  > 0) + I( eQt  = 0)(1  I(Q(1)t  = 0))
= I( eQt  > 0) + I( eQt  = 0)I(Q(1)t  > 0): (3.68)
Clearly 2I(Qt  > 0) is FQt -predictable and FQt  Gt; it follows from Fact 1 in
Section 3.2 that 2I(Qt  > 0) is the FQt -intensity of eZt. This concludes the proof
of Lemma 11.
3.5.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Before giving the proof of Theorem 7, we need some intermediate results.
Lemma 14. Assume that the queues start in equilibrium (with respect to a Poisson
process with arrival rate ), then
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 )  log(
1
e
)E[YT ]  log(2
e
)E[ZT ] +H(Q
(2)
0 ); (3.69)
where H(Q(2)0 ) is the entropy of Q
(2)
0 , i.e.,
H(Q
(2)
0 ) =  
1
1  2 (2 log 2 + (1  2) log(1  2)) : (3.70)
Proof. Using Kolmogorov’s formula we have [35, Lemma 3.2]
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 ) = I(XT0 ; Q(1)0 ;Y T0 )  I(Q(1)0 ;Y T0 jXT0 )
  I(XT0 ; Q(2)0 ;ZT0 ) + I(Q(2)0 ;ZT0 jXT0 ): (3.71)
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Since I(Q(1)0 ;Y T0 jXT0 )  0 and I(Q(2)0 ;ZT0 jXT0 )  H(Q(2)0 ), we have
I(XT0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ;ZT0 )  I(XT0 ; Q(1)0 ;Y T0 )  I(XT0 ; Q(2)0 ;ZT0 ) +H(Q(2)0 ): (3.72)
We will show now that
I(XT0 ; Q
(1)
0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ; Q(2)0 ;ZT0 )  log(
1
e
)E[YT ]  log(2
e
)E[ZT ]: (3.73)
We remind the reader of the following general formula for computing mutual
information. If you have a channel A
PBjA ! B, then for any probability distribu-
tionW such that PB  W we have
I(A;B) = D(PBjAjjW jPA) D(PBjjW ); (3.74)
where
D(PBjAjjW jPA) = EA[D(PBjA=ajjW )]; (3.75)
and EA[] designates the expectation with respect to the distribution of A. We
start working on the term I(XT0 ; Q
(1)
0 ;Y
T
0 ). In order to simplify the notation, we
will useX ,Y andQ0 instead ofXT0 , Y T0 andQ
(1)
0 . Applying the previous identity
with A = (X;Q0), B = Y ,W = P and PB = Y , we obtain
I(XT0 ; Q
(1)
0 ;Y
T
0 ) = EX;Q0

D(PY jX=x;Q0=q0 jjP)
 D(Y jjP): (3.76)
By denoting by pYx;q0(y) the Radon-Nikodym derivative of PY jX=x;Q0=q0(dy)with
respect to P(dy), we have
D(PY jX=x;Q0=q0 jjP) =
Z
pYx;q0(y) log(p
Y
x;q0
(y))P(dy) (3.77)
=
Z
log(pYx;q0(y))PY jX=x;Q0=q0(dy): (3.78)
Now, since P1(dy)  P(dy) (in fact these two measures are equivalent), we
have
dP1
dP
(y) =

1

yT
e (1 )T : (3.79)
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Using the chain rule for Radon-Nikodym derivatives and the results in Section
3.2 we have
log(pYx;q0(y)) = log

dPY jX=x;Q0=q0
dP1
(y)

+ log

dP1
dP
(y)

=
Z T
0
[log(
(1)
t )dyt + (1  (1)t )dt] + (  1)T   log()yT
=
Z T
0
log(1)dyt +
Z T
0
log(I(q
(1)
t  > 0))dyt + T
 
Z T
0
1I(q
(1)
t  > 0)dt+ (  1)T   log()yT ; (3.80)
where q(1)t = q0 + xt   yt. Note thatZ T
0
log(I(q
(1)
t  > 0))dyt = 0: (3.81)
This is because when I(q(1)t  > 0) = 0 no departures can happen at time t and so
dyt = 0. This leads to
log(pYx;q0(y)) = log
1


yT  
Z T
0
1I(q
(1)
t  > 0)dt+ T; (3.82)
Consequently, we can write
EX;Q0

D(PY jX=x;Q0=q0 jjP)

= T + log
1


E [YT ]  E
Z T
0
1I(Q
(1)
t  > 0)dt

;
(3.83)
where the expectation is over the joint distribution of (X;Q0; Y ). Recalling that
1I(Q
(1)
t  > 0) is the stochastic intensity of the process Yt we obtain that
E
Z T
0
1I(Q
(1)
t  > 0)dt

= E
Z T
0
dYt

= E[YT ]: (3.84)
That is
EX;Q0

D(PY jX=x;Q0=q0 jjP)

= T + log
1
e

E [YT ] : (3.85)
This leads to
I(XT0 ; Q
(1)
0 ;Y
T
0 ) = T + log
1
e

E [YT ] D(Y jjP): (3.86)
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A similar analysis shows that
I(XT0 ; Q
(2)
0 ;Z
T
0 ) = T + log
2
e

E [ZT ] D(Z jjP): (3.87)
We conclude that
I(XT0 ; Q
(1)
0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ; Q(2)0 ;ZT0 ) = log(
1
e
)E[YT ]  log(2
e
)E[ZT ]
 D(Y jjP) +D(Z jjP): (3.88)
The two queues under consideration are assumed to be in equilibrium with re-
spect to a Poisson process with rate . It follows that P is a fixed point for these
queues [45] (see also [48, Theorem T1 pp. 123-124]). Using the data processing
inequality given in Lemma 13 with Y1 = Y , Z1 = Z and 2 = P, Burke’s
theorem guarantees that Y2 = Z2 = P. Therefore
D(Y jjP)  D(Z jjP): (3.89)
This shows that
I(XT0 ; Q
(1)
0 ;Y
T
0 )  I(XT0 ; Q(2)0 ;ZT0 )  log(
1
e
)E[YT ]  log(2
e
)E[ZT ]; (3.90)
which concludes the proof of the lemma. Note that equality in the previous
inequality occurs when XT0 is Poisson with rate . Poisson codewords are then
optimal here.
We have now all the ingredients necessary to prove Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7. If Rs is achievable (when the queues are initially in equilib-
rium) at output rate  then for all 0 <  < 1
2
and sufficiently large n, there
exists an (n;M; Tn) code (with Tnn ! 1 ) such that lnMTn  Rs   , Per   and
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1
Tn
I(U ;ZTn0 )  . We have the following sequence of inequalities
Rs  lnM
Tn
+ 
 1
Tn(1  Per)(I(X
Tn
0 ;Y
Tn
0 )  I(XTn0 ;ZTn0 ) + I(U ;ZTn0 ) +H(Per)) + 
 1
1  

log(
1
e
)
E[YTn ]
Tn
  log(2
e
)
E[ZTn ]
Tn
+
1
Tn
H(Q
(2)
0 ) + +
1
Tn
H()

+ :
(3.91)
The second inequality comes from Lemma 12 and the third one from Lemma 14
and the code properties. Recall that both queues are stable since  < 2 < 1.
From the dynamics of the first queue, we have
E[YTn ]
Tn
=
E[Q
(1)
0 ]
Tn
+
E[XTn ]
Tn
  E[Q
(1)
Tn
]
Tn
(3.92)
=
1
Tn
1
1  1 +
n
Tn
  E[Q
(1)
Tn
]
Tn
: (3.93)
As
E[Q
(1)
Tn
]
Tn
! 0, this shows that E[YTn ]
Tn
! . Similarly E[ZTn ]
Tn
! . Therefore by
letting ! 0 and n!1 in the above inequality yields the desired result, i.e.,
Rs   log

1
2

: (3.94)
3.6 A different proof for the degradedness lemma
A model that is often used to describe the channel dynamics of the exponential
server queue is the one that views the queue as an operator that maps a se-
quence of inter-arrivals into a corresponding sequence of inter-departures. This
is themodel that was used byAnantharam andVerdu´ in their seminal paper [41]
and adopted afterwards by several other authors (see, e.g., [50]-[53]). Due to the
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widespread use of this model and because of its relative simplicity compared to
the point process approach used in this chapter, we deemed important to show
in this appendix how to prove the degradedness lemma using this model. We
believe that this can be potentially useful for researchers in this field. Moreover,
this proof should extend easily to the =Geom=1 queue which is the discrete time
analog of the =M=1 queue studied here.
3.6.1 Degradedness when the queues are initially empty
We start by describing the channel dynamics under this model when the queues
are initially empty. The sequence of inter-arrival times of the packets will be
denoted by An = (A1; :::; An). The time of the k-th arrival will be therefore ak =Pk
i=1Ai. The sequence of inter-departures from the legitimate receiver’s queue
(respectively the eavesdropper’s queue) will be denoted by Dn (respectively
En). Also, the time of the k-th departure from the legitimate receiver’s queue
(respectively the eavesdropper’s queue) will be dk =
Pk
i=1Di (respectively ek =Pk
i=1Ei).
We can express the kth inter-departure time Dk as follows
Dk = Wk + S1k; (3.95)
where Wk =
Pk
j=1Aj  
Pk 1
j=1 Dj
+
is the kth idle time of the server of the
main queue and fS1kgk1 is a sequence of i.i.d exponential random variables
with parameter 1 representing the sequence of service times of the main server.
Similarly
Ek = Vk + S2k; (3.96)
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with Vk =
Pk
j=1Aj  
Pk 1
j=1 Ej
+
and fS2kgk1 is a sequence of i.i.d exponential
random variables with parameter 2.
The channel transition probability modeling the legitimate queue is
PDnjAn(ynjxn) =
nY
i=1
exp1(yi   wi) (3.97)
where wi =
Pi
j=1 xj  
Pi 1
j=1 yj
+
and exp(y   w) denotes
exp(y   w) =
8><>:  exp( (y   w)); y  w;0; o:w:
Similarly we have
PEnjAn(znjxn) =
nY
i=1
exp2(zi   vi) (3.98)
with vi =
Pi
j=1 xj  
Pi 1
j=1 zj
+
.
After this brief introduction to the channel model we can now proceed to the
proof of the degradedness lemma.
Alternative proof for Lemma 11. We will provide a recursive construction of En
using only Dn (and some other random variables that are independent of
An) that will emulate the eavesdropper’s channel dynamics (3.98). Let Sn2 =
(S21; :::S2n) be a sequence of i.i.d. exponential random variables with parameter
2 (independent of all other random variables) and Mn = (M1; :::;Mn) be a se-
quence of i.i.d. mixed exponential random variables (independent of all other
random variables) defined as follows8><>: P [M1 = 0] =
2
1
P [M1 > xjM1 > 0] = exp( 2x):
Using these random variables, the recursive construction of En is done as fol-
lows:
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 Let E1 = D1 +M1.
 For k  2,
– If dk > ek 1
Ek = dk   ek 1 +Mk: (3.99)
– If dk  ek 1
Ek = S2k: (3.100)
This construction can be seen as if En were the inter-departures from a special
queue whose inter-arrivals are Dn. Indeed, we can write
Ek =
 
kX
i=1
Di  
k 1X
i=1
Ei
!+
+ Tk; (3.101)
the first term in this equation represents the k-th idle time of the server of this
special queue and Tk is the k-th service time. The caveat here is that the distribu-
tion of the service time is not independent of the idle time; indeed, as described
above, if the idle time is zero then Tk will be exponentially distributed (with
parameter 2) otherwise Tk will have a mixed exponential distribution. With
this construction we shall prove that PEnjAn(znjxn) is given by (3.98) which will
prove the degradedness.
From the law of total probability, we have
PEnjAn(znjxn) =
Z
Rn+
PEn;DnjAn(zn; ynjxn)dyn (3.102)
=
Z
Rn+
PEnjDn;An(znjyn; xn)PDnjAn(ynjxn)dyn: (3.103)
From the recursive construction described above, we haveAn ! Dn ! En form
a Markov chain. It follows that
PEnjAn(znjxn) =
Z
Rn+
PEnjDn(znjyn)PDnjAn(ynjxn)dyn: (3.104)
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Also, we can see that
PEnjDn(znjyn) =
nY
k=1
PEkjDn;Ek 1(zkjyn; zk 1) (3.105)
=
nY
k=1
PEkjDk;Ek 1(zkjyk; zk 1); (3.106)
where in the last equality we have used the fact that Ek and (Dk+1; :::; Dn) are
independent given (Dk; Ek 1). Consequently,
PEnjAn(znjxn) =
Z
Rn+
nY
k=1
PEkjDk;Ek 1(zkjyk; zk 1) exp1(yk   wk)dyn (3.107)
=
Z
Rn 1+
n 1Y
k=1
PEkjDk;Ek 1(zkjyk; zk 1)
exp1(yk   wk)In(zn; yn 1)dyn 1; (3.108)
where
In(z
n; yn 1) =
Z
R+
PEnjDn;En 1(znjyn; zn 1) exp1(yn   wn)dyn (3.109)
= 1
Z 1
wn
PEnjDn;En 1(znjyn; zn 1)e 1(yn wn)dyn: (3.110)
We will show that In depends on yn 1 only through xn 1. Let n 1 =
Pn 1
i=1 zi  Pn 1
i=1 yi and recall that by our construction n 1  0. We proceed by noting that
 If yn > n 1
Pr[En  zjDn = yn; En 1 = zn 1] = Pr[Mn  z + n 1   yn]: (3.111)
 And if yn  n 1
Pr[En  zjDn = yn; En 1 = zn 1] = Pr[S2n  z]: (3.112)
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We can then write PEnjDn;En 1(znjyn; zn 1) compactly as follows
PEnjDn;En 1(znjyn; zn 1) = 2e 2zn1fynn 1g+
2
1
(yn   (zn + n 1)) + (1  2
1
)2e
 2(zn+n 1 yn)1fyn<zn+n 1g

1fn 1<yng
(3.113)
where
(t) =
8><>: 1 if t = 0;0 otherwise:
and
1C =
8><>: 1 if C is true;0 otherwise:
To compute In, we need to distinguish between the two cases n 1  wn and
n 1  wn with wn =
Pn
j=1 xj  
Pn 1
j=1 yj
+
.
 If n 1  wn, In is computed as follows
In = 2e
 1(zn+n 1 wn) + 12(1  2
1
)
Z zn+n 1
n 1
e 1(yn wn)e 2(zn+n 1 yn)dyn
+ 2e
 2zn
Z n 1
wn
1e
 1(yn wn)dyn (3.114)
= 2e
 1(zn+n 1 wn) + 2e 1(n 1 wn)e 2zn(1  e(2 1)zn)
+ 2e
 2zn(1  e 1(n 1 wn)): (3.115)
After some cancelations, the last expression reduces to
In = 2 exp( 2zn): (3.116)
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 If n 1 < wn, then In can be computed as follows2
In = 2e
 1(zn+n 1 wn) + 12(1  2
1
)
Z zn+n 1
wn
e 1(yn wn)e 2(zn+n 1 yn)dyn
(3.117)
= 2e
 1(zn+n 1 wn) + 2e 2(zn+n 1 wn)(1  e(2 1)(zn+n 1 wn))
(3.118)
= 2 exp( 2(zn   (wn   n 1))): (3.119)
Notice now that
wn   n 1 = max( n 1;
nX
i=1
xi  
n 1X
i=1
yi   n 1)
= max( n 1;
nX
i=1
xi  
n 1X
i=1
zi): (3.120)
Since n 1  0 it follows that wn  n 1 if and only if
Pn
i=1 xi 
Pn 1
i=1 zi or
equivalently
vn
def
=
 
nX
i=1
xi  
n 1X
i=1
zi
!+
= 0 (3.121)
Similarly, when wn > n 1, we have
wn   n 1 =
nX
i=1
xi  
n 1X
i=1
zi =
 
nX
i=1
xi  
n 1X
i=1
zi
!+
= vn: (3.122)
Therefore, we can rewrite In written compactly as
In = exp2(zn   vn): (3.123)
This proves that In is only a function of xn and zn 1 (which are fixed quantities
here) and not a function of yn 1. The conditional density PEnjAn(znjxn) then
simplifies to
PEnjAn(znjxn) = exp2(zn vn)
Z
Rn 1+
n 1Y
k=1
PEkjDk;Ek 1(zkjyk; zk 1) exp1(yk wk)dyn 1:
(3.124)
2Note that the integral in the first line starts from wn and not from n 1 as in the previous
case.
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Using the same approach and proceeding inductively, we can deduce that
PEnjAn(znjxn) = I1
nY
i=2
exp2(zi   vi); (3.125)
where
I1 =
Z 1
x1
1e
 1(y1 x1)PE1jD1(z1jy1)dy1: (3.126)
Since E1 = D1 +M1, we have
PE1jD1(z1jy1) =
2
1
(z1   y1) + 2(1  2
1
)e 2(z1 y1)1fy1<z1g: (3.127)
After substituting this expression in the integral defining I1 and carrying out
the integration we obtain
I1 = exp2(z1   v1): (3.128)
We conclude that
PEnjAn(znjxn) =
nY
i=1
exp2(zi   vi); (3.129)
which is the channel transition probability of the :=M=1 queue with service rate
2. This proves that when 2 < 1, the eavesdropper’s channel is stochastically
degraded with respect to the legitimate receiver’s channel.
3.6.2 Degradedness when the queues are initially in equilib-
rium
We start this section by describing the communication protocol used when the
queues start in equilibrium. The transmission of information begins at time
0 when the encoder injects a synchronization packet called packet zero. This
special packet will find a random numberQ(1)0 of packets in the main queue and
Q
(2)
0 packets in the eavesdropper’s queue. The departure timeD0 of packet zero
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from the main queue is assumed to be observable by the legitimate decoder.
Similarly the eavesdropper observes the corresponding departure time E0 from
his own queue. After packet 0, the encoder sends the codeword packets at inter-
arrival times An and the legitimate receiver observes the inter-departures Dn =
(D0; :::; Dn), this sequence is related to the inter-arrivals through the following
channel transition probability [41]
PDnjAn(ynjxn) = exp1 (y0)
nY
i=1
exp1(yi   wi): (3.130)
with wi =
Pi
j=1 xj  
Pi 1
j=0 yj
+
. The eavesdropper similarly observes En =
(E0; :::; En) and we have
PEnjAn(znjxn) = exp2 (z0)
nY
i=1
exp2(zi   vi): (3.131)
with vi =
Pi
j=1 xj  
Pi 1
j=0 zj
+
. The proof of the degradedness here is very
similar to the proof when the queues start initially empty. We will provide a re-
cursive construction of En = (E0; :::; En) using only Dn = (D0; :::; Dn) and some
other random variables that will emulate the eavesdropper’s channel dynamics
(3.131). From standard results in queuing theory, we know that the departure
timeD0 of packet 0 is exponentially distributed with parameter 1  [41]. Sim-
ilarly E0 is exponentially distributed with parameter 2   . Let fM be a mixed
exponential random variable (independent of all other random variables)8><>: P [
fM = 0] = 2 
1 
P [fM > xjfM > 0] = exp( (2   )x):
We can construct E0 using D0 and fM as follows
E0 = D0 + fM: (3.132)
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Indeed,
E[eiuE0 ] = E[eiuD0 ]E[eiu
fM ] (3.133)
=
1   
1     iu

2   
1    +

1  2   
1   

2   
2     iu

(3.134)
=
2   
1     iu

1 +
1   2
2     iu

(3.135)
=
2   
2     iu; (3.136)
which is the characteristic function of an exponential random variable with pa-
rameter 2   . Now let dj =
Pj
i=0Di be the time of j-th departure from the
legitimate receiver’s queue (after the departure of packet 0) and analogously
define ej =
Pj
i=0Ei for the eavesdropper’s queue. As we did in the previous
section, we construct (E1; :::; En) recursively using (3.99) and (3.100). We shall
prove that through this construction, PEnjAn is indeed given by (3.131).
Proceeding similarly to the proof in the case when the queues start empty,
we have
PEnjAn(znjxn) =
Z
Rn+1+
PEn;DnjAn(zn; ynjxn)dyn+1 (3.137)
=
Z
Rn+1+
exp1 (y0)
nY
k=1
exp1(yk   wk)
nY
k=0
PEkjDk;Ek 1(zkjyk; zk 1)dyn+1: (3.138)
This integral can be written as follows
PEnjAn(znjxn) =
Z
R+
exp1 (y0)PE0jD0(z0jy0)Qndy0; (3.139)
where
Qn =
Z
Rn+
nY
k=1
PEkjDk;Ek 1(zkjyk; zk 1) exp1(yk   wk)dy1:::dyn: (3.140)
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We can invoke the result of the previous section and write that Qn is simply
given by
Qn =
nY
i=1
exp2(zi   vi): (3.141)
Consequently,
PEnjAn(znjxn) =
 
nY
i=1
exp2(zi   vi)
!
I0 (3.142)
where
I0 =
Z
R+
exp1 (y0)PE0jD0(z0jy0)dy0: (3.143)
If we can show that I0 = exp2 (z0), the proof will be complete. Note that
PE0jD0(z0jy0) =
2   
1   (z0   y0) +
1   2
1    (2   )e
 (2 )(z0 y0)1fy0 < z0g:
(3.144)
Substituting this expression in I0 we find
I0 = (2   )

e (1 )z0 + e (2 )z0
Z z0
0
(1   2)e (1 2)y0dy0

(3.145)
= (2   )

e (1 )z0 + e (2 )z0(1  e (1 2)z0) (3.146)
= (2   )e (2 )z0 : (3.147)
This shows that PEnjAn(znjxn) is given by (3.131) and completes the proof.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPRESSING NEIGHBORS IN A GAUSS-MARKOV TREE
4.1 Introduction
The topic of this chapter falls under the general umbrella of distributed com-
pression of Gaussian sources. We focus here on a problem that can be classified
as a special instance of the remote vector source coding problem. The problem
considered is depicted in Figure 4.1. The main components are summarized in
the bullets below.
Figure 4.1: Source coding problem
 There are two sources of interest that are the roots of a given Gauss-
Markov tree. These sources denoted here by f(X1(t); X2(t)) ; t = 1; 2; :::g
consist of a stream of i.i.d. jointly Gaussian random variables.
 A given number (say N ) of encoders observe the leaves of the tree. En-
coder i observes the stream fYi(t); t = 1; 2:::g. The encoders are not al-
lowed to cooperate and each one of them compresses its own observation
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and sends amessage to the decoder over a rate-constrained noiseless chan-
nel. The capacity of the channel linking the ith encoder to the decoder will
be denoted by Ri.
 The decoder, after receiving the N messages, attempts to reconstruct the
sources of interest (X1; X2) subject to separate distortion constraints on
the time-average quadratic error of the estimate of X1 and the estimate
of X2. We stress here that we are not trying to reconstruct the vector
X = [X1; X2]
T subject to a matrix distortion constraint. Instead we con-
strain only the diagonal elements of the error covariance matrix of the re-
construction ofX = [X1; X2]T .
 Problem Statement: In this chapter we characterize the minimum sum-
rate (minimum of
PN
i=1Ri) required to achieve a target pair of distortions
(d1; d2) on the error of reconstruction ofX1 andX2. We show that a simple
compression architecture that performs separate lossy quantization using
Gaussian test channels followed by Slepian-Wolf binning is sum-rate op-
timal [60]. This scheme is sometimes referred to by some authors as the
Berger-Tung (BT) scheme. In the rest of this chapter we will adopt the
same terminology.
The approach used here is a more sophisticated version of the argument em-
ployed in [54] to obtain the minimum sum-rate for the quadratic Gaussian two-
encoder source coding problem. The sum-rate of every code is lower bounded
using two different methods. Whereas [54] uses the CEO bound [62], here we
use the tree bound [55] which gives the sum-rate required to reconstruct an
auxiliary Gaussian random variable X0 that induces conditional independence
betweenX1 andX2. For the other bound, [54] uses a simple cooperative bound,
while here we use a recent bound derived by Oohama [56] for the problem of
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compressing the vector X = [X1; X2]T subject to a matrix distortion constraint
on the error covariance matrix of the reconstruction. For some codes the first
method yields a tighter bound whereas for others the second method is better.
A composite lower bound is obtained by taking the maximum between these
two bounds. We prove that this lower bound equals the minimum sum-rate
achieved by the best Berger-Tung scheme when this one achieves both distor-
tions constraints with equality. When only one of the distortion constraints is
active for the best Berger-Tung scheme, we show that it is still sum-rate optimal
by providing a separate lower bound on the sum-rate.
The determination of the rate region of correlated Gaussian hidden (or re-
mote) sources has received a great deal of attention lately, in part because the re-
mote source coding problem can be instrumental in determining the rate region
for other multi-terminal source-coding problems [54], [56], [58]. Both Oohama
[56] and Yang and Xiong [59], for instance, consider problems similar to the
one treated here. The work closest to this one is Tavildar et al. [55], who show
that the BT scheme with Gaussian auxiliary random variables achieves the en-
tire rate region for the problem of reproducing a single variable that can be
embedded in a Gauss-Markov tree with the observed variables. This chapter
represents the first step in extending that result to the reproduction of a pair
of sources that are neighbors in the tree. We are currently studying how to
strengthen our result to fully subsume that of [55], by extending the sum-rate
result provided here to a rate region result.
We shall see that the assumption that the two variables of interest are neigh-
bors in the tree is crucial for our result. Thus a natural next step would be to
study the problem of reproducing three neighboring variables in the tree. By re-
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moving the distortion constraint on the middle variable of the triple, one could
obtain a result for pairs of variables that are separated by at most one variable
in the tree, which in particular would solve the Gaussian one-help-two prob-
lem under a tree constraint. The ultimate goal would be to handle distortion
constraints on an arbitrary number of variables in the tree.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The formulation of the prob-
lem and the main result are described in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 contains the
direct part of the argument. The converse is given in Section 4.4. Specifically,
in Section 4.4.1 we describe the converse when only one distortion constraint is
active for the best BT scheme and in Section 4.4.2 we provide the converse when
the best BT scheme achieves both distortion constraints with equality.
4.2 Problem Formulation and Main Result
To simplify the exposition, throughout the chapter we will assume that the
Gauss-Markov tree, connecting the sources of interest and the observations of
the encoders, is binary. This assumption can be made without any loss of gener-
ality. Indeed Tavildar et. al. [55] have shown that any Gauss-Markov tree can be
transformed into a (potentially) larger binary Gauss-Markov tree. Binary trees
have the desired property that they can be described with “minimal” notations
which facilitates the presentation of the proof of our main result.
We will slightly change the notation used in the introduction to adopt a no-
tation that is more suitable for the binary tree depicted in Figure 4.2. Since
we will sometimes refer to [55], we purposely use the notation used by Tavil-
dar et al. in that paper. The two sources of interest will be now denoted by
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Figure 4.2: Source coding problem with a binary Gauss-Markov tree
n
x(1)(t) = [x
(1)
1 (t); x
(1)
2 (t)]
T ; t = 1; 2; :::
o
. This is a sequence of i.i.d. jointly Gaus-
sian random variables with zero mean and covariance matrix
Kx(1) =
264 1 
 1
375 : (4.1)
For a given tree depth l 2 f1; :::; L  1g and a given node index i 2 f1; :::; 2lg, the
decedents of the ith node x(l)i are constructed as follows
x
(l+1)
2i 1 (t) = 
(l+1)
2i 1 x
(l)
i (t) + z
(l+1)
2i 1 (t) (4.2)
x
(l+1)
2i (t) = 
(l+1)
2i x
(l)
i (t) + z
(l+1)
2i (t); (4.3)
where f(l)i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2lg is a given sequence of real numbers and
t = 1; 2; ::: is the time index. The random variables fz(l)i (t); l = 2; :::; L; i =
1; :::; 2l; t = 1; 2; :::g are independent Gaussian random variables with zero mean
and the variance of z(l)i (t)will be denoted by 
2
z
(l)
i
. For the rest of the chapter we
will assume that 2
z
(l)
i
> 0 for all i and l. This assumption can be relaxed by
invoking the continuity argument used in [55].
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For l = 1; :::; L and i = 1; :::; 2l, a block of length n of x(l)i will be denoted by
x
(l)
i;n =

x
(l)
i (1); :::; x
(l)
i (n)

: (4.4)
After observing x(L)i;n , encoder i 2 f1; :::; 2Lg sends a message to the decoder
using a mapping
f
(n)
i : Rn 7!
n
1; :::;M
(n)
i
o
:
The decoder combines all 2L received messages to form the estimates dx(1)1;n andd
x
(1)
2;n of x
(1)
1;n and x
(1)
2;n using the following mappings
'
(n)
i :
n
1; :::;M
(n)
1
o
 :::
n
1; :::;M
(n)
2L
o
7! Rn ; i = 1; 2
Since the distortion metric that we will use here is the mean square error distor-
tion, wemay assume that '(n)1 and '
(n)
2 areminimummean square error (MMSE)
estimators.
Definition A rate distortion vector (R1; :::; R2L ; d1; d2) is said to be strict-sense
achievable if there exists a block length n, encoders f (n)i ; i = 1; ::; 2
L and a de-
coder ('(n)1 ; '
(n)
2 ) such that
Ri  1
n
logM
(n)
i for i = 1; :::; 2
L: (4.5)
di  1
n
nX
t=1
E[(x
(1)
i (t) dx(1)i (t))2] for i = 1; 2: (4.6)
We denote the set of strict-sense achievable rate-distortion vectors by RDs. We
define the set of achievable rate-distortion vectors to be the closure (denoted by
RDs) ofRDs. For a given d1 and d2, we define the rate region of this problem to
be
R(d1; d2) =

(R1; :::; R2L) : (R1; :::; R2L ; d1; d2) 2 RDs
	
: (4.7)
The sum rate of the problem is then
Rsum(d1; d2) = inf
8<:
2LX
i=1
Ri : (R1; :::; R2L) 2 R(d1; d2)
9=; : (4.8)
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We will assume here that max(d1; d2) < min(1; 2min(d1; d2) + 1   2).1 Re-
quiring that max(d1; d2) < 1 should be clear. The condition max(d1; d2) <
2min(d1; d2) + 1   2 however warrants further justifications. If this condition
was not true, say for instance d2  2d1 + 1   2, then the encoders can send
information about the source x(1)1 and completely disregard x
(1)
2 . The decoder
then reconstructs x(1)1 with a distortion no greater than d1. Now since we can
write x(1)2 = x
(1)
1 + z for some z  N (0; 1   2). The decoder will be able to
reconstruct x(1)2 with a distortion less than 2d1+1 2 which is in turn less than
d2. Hence, if the condition max(d1; d2) < 2min(d1; d2) + 1   2 is violated, the
problem can be solved as if one of the sources x(1)1 or x
(1)
2 was not present. This
problem reduces then to the Gaussian many-help-one distributed source coding
problem addressed in [55].
Figure 4.3: Separation scheme
There is a natural scheme that can employed to perform the compression.
This method, often called the Berger-Tung scheme, separates the analog and
digital aspects of the compression as in Figure 4.3. Specifically, each encoder
first performs a vector quantization using a Gaussian test channel. This creates
multiple correlated digital messages which can be encoding distributively us-
1In fact, not all values of d1 and d2 are attainable and so there is an extra condition that must
be satisfied by d1 and d2. This condition states that there exists some covariance matrix Kv(L)
such that d1 >Kv(L)(1; 1) and d2 >Kv(L)(2; 2). This condition will be discussed later in Section
4.4.2.
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ing Slepian-Wolf encoding (also known as binning). The minimum sum rate
required by this scheme will be denoted by RG(d1; d2). The main result of this
chapter is the following theorem.
Theorem 8. For the source coding problem depicted in Figure 4.1, the Berger-Tung
scheme is sum-rate optimal, i.e.,
Rsum(d1; d2) = RG(d1; d2): (4.9)
The rest of this chapter is dedicated to proving this theorem. In the next
section we start with the achievability part of the proof.
4.3 Direct part
The direct part of the main result, i.e., RG(d1; d2)  Rsum(d1; d2) follows from
standard results in information theory [60],[61]. The main goal of this section is
to give an explicit characterization ofRG(d1; d2) that will be used in the converse.
To describe a distributed Gaussian test channel, we associate to encoder i 2
f1; :::; 2Lg a random variable Ui such that Ui = x(L)i +  i where  i  N (0; 2 i)
is independent of all other random variables. We introduce the following noise
quantization rates
r
(L)
i = I(x
(L)
i ;Uijx(L 1)d i
2
e ) i = 1; :::; 2
L; (4.10)
and we construct recursively
r
(l)
i = fx(l)i
(r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ); l = 2; :::; L  1 i = 1; :::; 2l (4.11)
where
f
x
(l)
i
(r1; r2) =
1
2
log

1 + 2
z
(l)
i
[s
(l+1)
2i 1 (1  2 2r1) + s(l+1)2i (1  2 2r2)]

; (4.12)
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and
s
(l+1)
j =
 

(l+1)
j

z
(l+1)
j
!2
j = 2i  1; 2i: (4.13)
Define also
T1(r
(2)
1 ; r
(2)
2 ) =
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i (1  2 2r
(2)
i ) (4.14)
T2(r
(2)
3 ; r
(2)
4 ) =
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i (1  2 2r
(2)
i ): (4.15)
From (4.11), we can see that T1 and T2 are in fact functions of r
(L)
1 ; :::; r
(L)
2L 1 and
r
(L)
2L 1+1; :::; r
(L)
2L
respectively. Finally, define
C1(r
(L)
1 ; :::; r
(L)
2L 1) =
(1  2)[1 + (1  2)T2(r(2)3 ; r(2)4 )]
[1 + (1  2)T1(r(2)1 ; r(2)2 )][1 + (1  2)T2(r(2)3 ; r(2)4 )]  2
  d1
C2(r
(L)
2L 1+1; :::; r
(L)
2L
) =
(1  2)[1 + (1  2)T1(r(2)1 ; r(2)2 )]
[1 + (1  2)T1(r(2)1 ; r(2)2 )][1 + (1  2)T2(r(2)3 ; r(2)4 )]  2
  d2
	(r
(2)
1 ; :::; r
(2)
4 ) =
[1 + (1  2)T1(r(2)1 ; r(2)2 )][1 + (1  2)T2(r(2)3 ; r(2)4 )]  2
1  2 :
The following lemma gives an expression for RG(d1; d2) in terms of an optimiza-
tion problem.
Lemma 15. The sum rate achieved by the best Berger-Tung scheme is given by
RG(d1; d2) =minimize
1
2
log	(r
(2)
1 ; :::; r
(2)
4 ) +
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to C1(r
(L)
1 ; :::; r
(L)
2L 1)  0;
C2(r
(L)
2L 1+1; :::; r
(L)
2L
)  0
r
(L)
i  0; i = 1; :::; 2L:
(4.16)
Proof. See Section 4.5.
90
For the rest of this chapter we will use o = (o(L)1 ; :::; o
(L)
2L
) to denote a solution
to this non-convex optimization problem. It is not clear a priori what type of
properties this optimizer must possess. It is easy to verify however that at least
one of the distortion constraints must be saturated at o. Two separate cases must
be considered therefore. Case 1: the optimal Gaussian test channel achieves
only one distortion constraint with equality (in this case we will assume with-
out loss of generality that only the first constraint is saturated) and case 2: the
optimal Gaussian test channel achieves both distortion constraints with equal-
ity. Throughout the rest of this chapter we will use the following variables
o
(l)
i = fx(l)i
(o
(l+1)
2i 1 ; o
(l+1)
2i ); l = 2; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l; (4.17)
and
T 1 = T1(o
(2)
1 ; o
(2)
2 ) (4.18)
T 2 = T2(o
(2)
3 ; o
(2)
4 ) (4.19)
C1 = C1(o
(L)
1 ; :::; o
(L)
2L 1) (4.20)
C2 = C2(o
(L)
2L 1+1; :::; o
(L)
2L
) (4.21)
We will see in the next section that we will need a separate conserve for each
case. This will require a more elaborate characterization of o. This will be es-
tablished by showing that o satisfies a set of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions. For that we need the following technical lemma.
Lemma 16. The optimal distributed Gaussian test channel o = (o(L)1 ; :::; o
(L)
2L
) is regu-
lar.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we show that o satisfies the linear independence
constraint qualification [66, Theorem 12.1]. Refer to Section 4.6 for further de-
tails.
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Now that we know that o is regular, we move to the description of the KKT
conditions satisfied by o. The regularity of o implies that for some (t1; :::; t2L)  0
and 01; 02  0, o must satisfy the following KKT conditions
0 = tio
(L)
i i = 1; :::; 2
L; (4.22a)
for i = 1; :::; 2L 1:
ti =
C1 + d1
2 ln(2)
@T1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o + 1 +
L 1X
l=2
@r
(l)
d i
2L l e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o + 01
@C1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o + 02
@C2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o;
(4.22b)
for i = 2L 1 + 1; :::; 2L:
ti =
C2 + d2
2 ln(2)
@T2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o + 1 +
L 1X
l=2
@r
(l)
d i
2L l e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o + 01
@C1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o + 02
@C2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o;
(4.22c)
0 = 0iC

i ; i = 1; 2: (4.22d)
These KKT conditions will be examined more thoroughly in the next sections.
4.3.1 Case 1
We start with the case when the optimal Gaussian test channel o achieves only
one distortion constraint with equality. In the following, we assume without
loss of generality that at o only the first distortion is met with equality. In this
case we have C1 = 0 and C2 < 0. From (4.22d) we can immediately see that
02 = 0. We would like now to simplify further (4.22b) and (4.22c). Since C1 = 0,
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using (4.192), we have
@C1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =  d21
@T1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o i = 1; :::; 2L 1: (4.23)
Let 1 = 2 ln(2)01, for i = 1; :::; 2L 1 we have then
ti =
d1
2 ln(2)
@T1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o + 1 +
L 1X
l=2
@r
(l)
d i
2L l e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o + 01
@C1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o (4.24)
= 1 +
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o
0@1 + L 2X
l=2
@r
(l)
d i
2L l e
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
jr=o + d1   1d
2
1
2 ln(2)
@T1
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
jr=o
1A (4.25)
where in the second equality we have used
@T1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o = @T1
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
jr=o
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o; (4.26)
and
@r
(l)
d i
2L l e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o
@r
(l)
d i
2L l e
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
jr=o: (4.27)
These two identities follow from the chain rule for partial derivative combined
with (4.11). For a more elaborate explanation refer to Section 4.6. Now since
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o = s(L)i 2z(L 1)d i2 e
2 2o
(L)
i 2
 2o(L 1)d i2 e (4.28)
we can write
ti = 	
(L)
i i = 1; :::; 2
L 1; (4.29)
with 	(L)1 ; :::;	
(L)
2L 1 defined recursively through
	
(l)
k = 1 + s
(l)
k 
2
z
(l 1)
d k2 e
2 2o
(l)
i 2
 2o(l 1)
d k2 e 	
(l 1)
d k
2
e ; l = 3; :::; L; k = 1; :::; 2
l 1 (4.30)
with
	
(2)
k = 1 
1
2 ln(2)
@T1
@r
(2)
k
jr=o = 1  1s(2)k 2 2o
(2)
k ; k = 1; 2; (4.31)
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with 1
def
= 1d
2
1   d1.
Now for i = 2L 1 + 1; :::; 2L, using C1 = 0, we have
@C1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =   
2(1  2)2
((1 + (1  2)T 1 )(1 + (1  2)T 2 )  2)2
@T2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o (4.32)
=   
2d21
(1 + (1  2)T 2 )2
@T2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o: (4.33)
Also
C2 + d2 =
d1(1 + (1  2)T 1 )
1 + (1  2)T 2
=
1  2
1 + (1  2)T 2
+
2d1
(1 + (1  2)T 2 )2
(4.34)
Consequently, using transformations similar to those used above, (4.22c) be-
comes
ti = 1 +
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o
0@1 + L 2X
l=2
@r
(l)
d i
2L l e
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
jr=o + (1  
2)
1 + (1  2)T 2


1  
2
1  2
1
1 + (1  2)T 2

1
2 ln(2)
@T2
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
jr=o
1A : (4.35)
We can therefore deduce that
ti = 	
(L)
i ; i = 2
L 1 + 1; :::; 2L (4.36)
with 	(L)
2L 1+1; :::;	
(L)
2L
defined recursively as follows
	
(l)
k = 1 + s
(l)
k 
2
z
(l 1)
d k2 e
2 2o
(l)
k 2
 2o(l 1)d k2 e 	(l 1)d k
2
e ; l = 3; :::; L; k = 2
l 1 + 1; :::; 2l (4.37)
and
	
(2)
k = 1 +
(1  2)s(2)k 2 2o
(2)
k
1 + (1  2)T 2

1  
2
1  2
1
1 + (1  2)T 2

; k = 3; 4: (4.38)
4.3.2 Case 2
Here we assume that the optimal Gaussian test channel o achieves both distor-
tion constraints with equality. In this situation we have C1 = C2 = 0 and (see
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Section 4.6)
@C1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =  d21
@T1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o; i = 1; :::; 2L 1 (4.39)
@C1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =  d1d2()2 @T2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o; i = 2L 1 + 1; :::; 2L: (4.40)
and
@C2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =  d1d2()2 @T1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o; i = 1; :::; 2L 1 (4.41)
@C2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =  d22
@T2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o; i = 2L 1 + 1; :::; 2L: (4.42)
Replacing these identities in (4.22b) and (4.22c) we find
ti = 1  1
2 ln(2)
@T1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o +
L 1X
l=2
@r
(l)
d i
2L l e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o; i = 1; :::; 2L 1 (4.43)
ti = 1  2
2 ln(2)
@T2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o +
L 1X
l=2
@r
(l)
d i
2L l e
@r
(L)
i
jr=o; i = 2L 1 + 1; :::; 2L (4.44)
where i = 2 ln(2)0i; i = 1; 2 and
1 = 1d
2
1 + 2d1d2(
)2   d1; (4.45)
2 = 2d
2
2 + 1d1d2(
)2   d2: (4.46)
Proceeding as in case 1, we find that
ti = 	
(L)
i ; i = 1; :::; 2
L (4.47)
where 	(L)i is defined recursively through (4.30) and (4.37) but with
	
(2)
k = 1  1s(2)k 2 2o
(2)
k ; k = 1; 2 (4.48)
	
(2)
k = 1  2s(2)k 2 2o
(2)
k ; k = 3; 4: (4.49)
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4.4 Converse
4.4.1 Case 1 Converse
Theorem 9. When the optimal Gaussian test channel achieves only the first distortion
with equality we have
Rsum(d1; d2)  RG(d1; d2): (4.50)
Proof. The converse in case 1 is based on the outer bound derived in [55]. Let
C = (C1; :::; C2L) designate all the messages sent to the decoder. Then, using the
conditional independence relations imposed by the tree structure and the chain
rule for mutual information we obtain the following sequence of identities
2LX
i=1
Ri  1
n
H(C ) (4.51)
=
1
n
I(C ; fx(l)i;n; l = 1; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2lg) (4.52)
=
1
n
I(C ;x
(1)
1;n) +
1
n
I(C2L 1+1; :::; C2L ; x
(1)
2;njx(1)1;n)
+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
1
n
I(CO(x(l)i )
; x
(l)
i;njx(l 1)d i
2
e;n) (4.53)
 1
2
log
1
d1
+ r +
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i ; (4.54)
where in the last step we have used the classical inequality2
1
n
I(C ;x
(1)
1;n) 
1
2
log
1
d1
and defined
r
(l)
i
def
=
1
n
I(CO(x(l)i )
;x
(l)
i;njx(l 1)d i
2
e;n)
2See page 575 in [55].
96
and
r
def
=
1
n
I(C2L 1+1; :::; C2L ; x
(1)
2;njx(1)1;n):
Since x(1)2;n; x
(2)
1;n; x
(2)
2;n are conditionally independent given x
(1)
1;n, using [62, Lem-
mas 2 and 3] we can obtain the following inequality
1
d1
 2 2n I(C ;x(1)1;n) (4.55)
 1 +
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i

1  2 2r(2)i

+
2
1  2 (1  2
 2r): (4.56)
Note that we can write x(1)2 as x
(1)
2 = x
(1)
1 + z for some z  N (0; 1   2) that
is independent of x(1)1 . Since for i = 3; 4 we have x
(2)
i = 
(2)
i x
(1)
2 + z
(2)
i with
z
(2)
i independent of x
(1)
1 we can use Lemma 4 in [55] to guarantee that r; r
(2)
3 ; r
(2)
4
satisfy the following inequality
r  1
2
log
 
1 + (1  2)
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i (1  2 2r
(2)
i )
!
: (4.57)
Also from Lemma 4 in [55], for all l = 2; :::; L  1 and i = 1; :::; 2l, we have
r
(l)
i  fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ); (4.58)
where f
x
(l)
i
is the function defined in (4.12). Consequently, we arrive to the fol-
lowing lower bound on the sum rate
Rsum(d1; d2)  Lsum; (4.59)
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where Lsum is defined as follows
Lsum =minimize 1
2
log
1
d1
+ r +
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to r  1
2
log
 
1 + (1  2)
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i (1  2 2r
(2)
i )
!
;
1
d1
 1 +
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i

1  2 2r(2)i

+
2
1  2 (1  2
 2r);
r
(l)
i  fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ); l = 2; :::; L  1 i = 1; :::; 2l;
r; r
(l)
i  0 l = 2; :::; L i = 1; :::; 2l:
The optimization problem above is convex and the KKT conditions here are both
necessary and sufficient. These conditions read as follows, (r; r(l)i ; l = 2; :::; L; i =
1; :::; 2l) is optimal if and only if there exists (; ; ; (l)i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l) 
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0 and ( (l)i ; l = 2; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l)  0 such that3
0 = 1  +     
2
1  22
 2r; (4.60a)
0 = 1  (2)i +  (2)i   s(2)i 2 2r
(2)
i ; i = 1; 2 (4.60b)
0 = 1  (2)i +  (2)i   
(1  2)s(2)i 2 2r
(2)
i
1 + (1  2)P4i=3 s(2)i (1  2 2r(2)i ) ; i = 3; 4 (4.60c)
0 = 1  (l)i +  (l)i    (l 1)d i
2
e s
(l)
i 
2
z
(l 1)
d i2 e
2 2r
(l)
i 2
 2f
x
(l 1)
d i2 e ; l = 3; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l
(4.60d)
0 = 1  (L)i    (L 1)d i
2
e s
(L)
i 
2
z
(L 1)
d i2 e
2 2r
(L)
i 2
 2f
x
(L 1)
d i2 e ; i = 1; :::; 2L (4.60e)
0 = r; 0 = 
(l)
i r
(l)
i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l (4.60f)
0 = 
 
r   1
2
log
 
1 + (1  2)
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i (1  2 2r
(2)
i )
!!
(4.60g)
0 = 
 
1
d1
  1 
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i

1  2 2r(2)i

  
2
1  2 (1  2
 2r)
!
(4.60h)
0 = 
(l)
i

r
(l)
i   fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i )

; l = 2; :::; L  1 i = 1; :::; 2l (4.60i)
An examination of this system shows that the Lagrange multiplier  must
be positive. Indeed, if  = 0, then from (4.60a) and (4.60b) we will have
; 
(2)
1 ; 
(2)
2 > 0 which in turn means that r = r
(2)
1 = r
(2)
2 = 0. This is not
possible since d1 < 1. We will now identify a solution to this system us-
ing the optimal Gaussian test channel o = (o(L)1 ; :::; o
(L)
2L
) (which satisfies the
system of equations in (4.22)). Define o = 1
2
log (1 + (1  2)T 2 ). Using the
characterization of o given by (4.22), we can verify that by setting r = o and
r
(l)
i = o
(l)
i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l the KKT conditions in (4.60) are satisfied with
3The primal feasibility conditions have been omitted. This will be usually the norm through-
out the chapter.
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an appropriate choice of KKT multiplies. For this choice, first set
 = 0; (4.61)
 = 1; (4.62)
 =
2
1  212
 2o   1: (4.63)
Then 1 +  =  
2
1 22
 2o and therefore (4.60a) is satisfied. However, since
 must be nonnegative, in order for this coupling to be valid we must have
1  2
1 212
 2o

 0.4 In fact we will establish that
1  
2
1  212
 2o < 0:
To show this inequality we give a proof by contradiction. Assume that 1  
2
1 212
 2o  0, then we must have 	(2)3 ;	(2)4 > 0 which in turn gives that
ti = 	
(L)
i > 0 for i = 2
L 1 + 1; :::; 2L. By (4.22a) it follows then that o(L)i = 0
for i = 2L 1 + 1; :::; 2L. Recalling that o(l)i = fx(l)i (o
(l+1)
2i 1 ; o
(l+1)
2i ), we see that o
(l)
i = 0
for l = 2; :::; L  1 and i = 2l 1 + 1; :::; 2l. In particular o(2)3 = o(2)4 = 0 and T 2 = 0.
The condition C1 = 0 implies then
d1(1 + (1  2)T 1 ) =
2d1
1 + (1  2)T 2
+ 1  2 = 2d1 + 1  2: (4.64)
However the second distortion constraint is inactive at o, i.e., C2 < 0 or equiva-
lently
d1(1 + (1  2)T 1 ) < d2(1 + (1  2)T 2 ) (4.65)
= d2: (4.66)
We conclude that
2d1 + (1  2) < d2: (4.67)
4Note that this will in turn prove that 1  0 and so the choice  = 1 will be also valid.
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This contradicts however our initial assumption that d2  2d1+(1 2). There-
fore 1  2
1 212
 2o < 0 and the coupling above is legitimate.
We continue now the task of showing that o and o(l)i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l
satisfy the KKT conditions in (4.60). It should be clear to the reader that (4.60g)-
(4.60i) are satisfied. For i = 1; :::; 4, set

(2)
i = max(0; 	(2)i ); (4.68)

(2)
i = max(0;	
(2)
i ): (4.69)
Then clearly (4.60b) and (4.60c) are satisfied with this choice. Before tackling
(4.60d), we consider (4.60e) first. Let

(L 1)
i = max(0; 	(L 1)i ); i = 1; :::; 2L 1 (4.70)

(L)
i = min(1; ti) i = 1; :::; 2
L: (4.71)
As ti = 	
(L)
i , we can verify using (4.30) and (4.37) that (4.60e) holds with this
choice. Now for (4.60d), we set

(l)
i = max(0; 	(l)i ); l = 3; :::; L  2; i = 1; :::; 2l (4.72)

(l)
i = max(1; 1 	(l)i ) max(0; 1 	(l)i ) l = 3; :::; L  1 i = 1; :::; 2l: (4.73)
Then
1 + 
(l)
i    (l 1)d i
2
e s
(l)
i 
2
z
(l 1)
d i2 e
2 2o
(l)
i 2
 2o(l 1)d i2 e = max(1; 1 	(l)i )
 max(0; s(l)i 2z(l 1)d i2 e
2 2o
(l)
i 2
 2o(l 1)d i2 e 	(l)d i
2
e)
(4.74)
= max(1; 1 	(l)i ) max(0; 1 	(l)i )
(4.75)
= 
(l)
i ; (4.76)
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which shows that (4.60d) is verified with this choice. It remains to check the
complementary slackness conditions (l)i o
(l)
i = 0 for l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l. For
l = 2, we will make the verification for i = 1 only, the rest of the cases are similar.
If 	(2)1  0, then (2)1 = 0 and a fortiori (2)1 o(2)1 = 0. Assume that 	(2)1 > 0, then
from the definition of 	(L) we have 	(L)j > 0 for j = 1; :::; 2
L 2 or equivalently
tj > 0 for j = 1; :::; 2L 2 which implies that o
(L)
j = 0 for j = 1; :::; 2
L 2. Recalling
that o(l)i = fx(l)i (o
(l+1)
2i 1 ; o
(l+1)
2i ), we see that o
(l)
i = 0 for l = 2; :::; L   1 and i =
1; :::; 2l 2. In particular o(2)1 = 0 and hence 
(2)
1 o
(2)
1 = 0.
Let now l 2 f3; :::; L   1g, if 	(l)i  0, then (l)i = 0 and (l)i o(l)i = 0. If
	
(l)
i > 0, then an argument similar to the one above shows that o
(l)
i = 0 and
hence (l)i o
(l)
i = 0. Finally, for l = L, we have

(L)
i o
(L)
i = min(o
(L)
i ; o
(L)
i ti) = min(o
(L)
i ; 0) = 0: (4.77)
This establishes the optimality of (o; o(l)i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l), i.e.,
Lsum = 1
2
log
1
d1
+ o +
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
o
(l)
i
=
1
2
log
1
d1
+
1
2
log
 
1 + (1  2)T 2

+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
o
(l)
i
(a)
=
1
2
log

[1 + (1  2)T 1 ][1 + (1  2)T 2 ]  2
1  2

+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
o
(l)
i
= RG(d1; d2);
where (a) follows from the fact that C1 = 0. This shows that Rsum(d1; d2) 
RG(d1; d2) and completes the proof of the converse in this case.
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4.4.2 Case 2 Converse
The following technical lemma will be needed to prove the converse.
Lemma 17. Let
f(x) = 2[1 + (1  x)(1 + 11)][1 + (1  x)1]; (4.78)
g(x) = [x+ (x  2)2][2x+ (x  2)(1 + 22)]: (4.79)
Then, if the optimal Gaussian test channel o achieves both distortions with equality, the
equation f(x) = g(x) has a unique root in the interval [2; 1]. Moreover this root is
given by
x = 
(1 + 1)
p
1 + d1 + 2
p
2 + d2
(1 + 2)
p
2 + d2 + 1
p
1 + d1
; (4.80)
Proof. Refer to Section 4.7.
Theorem 10. When the optimal Gaussian test channel achieves both distortions with
equality we have
Rsum(d1; d2)  RG(d1; d2): (4.81)
Proof. The converse argument will depend on the value of x. We will distin-
guish two different cases: x 2 f2; 1g and 2 < x < 1.
The case x 2 f2;1g
We will consider only the case x = 1, the case x = 2 can be solved along the
same lines. From the proof of Theorem 9, we know that
Rsum(d1; d2)  Lsum: (4.82)
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When x = 1, we will show that RG(d1; d2) = Lsum. To establish this a similar
approach to the one used in the previous section will be employed. Define first
o =
1
2
log
 
1 + (1  2)T 2

=
1
2
log(1 + (1  2)2): (4.83)
Using the characterization of o, we can verify that by setting r = o and r(l)i =
o
(l)
i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l the KKT conditions in (4.60) are satisfied with an
appropriate choice of parameters. Set
 = 0 (4.84)
 = 1 (4.85)
 =
2(1 + (1  2)2)
1  2 : (4.86)
We start by verifying (4.60a). Since, f(1) = g(1), we have
21 = (1 + (1  2)2)(1  2 + 2(1 + (1  2)2)): (4.87)
This means that
1 +  = 1 +
2(1 + (1  2)2)
1  2 ; (4.88)
=
2
1  2
1
1 + (1  2)2 ; (4.89)
= 
2
1  22
 2o ; (4.90)
which shows that (4.60a) holds with this choice. However, since  and  must
be nonnegative, for the above choice to be valid we need to have 1; 2  0.
This is not hard to verify and in fact 1; 2 > 0. Indeed, in Section 4.6, we have
shown that there must exist an i 2 f1; :::; 2L 1g and a j 2 f2L 1 + 1; :::; 2Lg
such that o(L)i ; o
(L)
j > 0. In other words there must exist an i
 2 f1; :::; 2L 1g and
a j 2 f2L 1 + 1; :::; 2Lg such that ti = tj = 0. This is only possible when
1; 2 > 0. Because if for instance 1  0, then from the definition of 	(L) we
must have 	(L)i > 0 for i = 1; :::; 2
L 1, i.e., ti > 0 for i = 1; :::; 2L 1.
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For the rest of the KKT parameters, the selection is exactly similar to the one
described in case 1, i.e.,

(l)
i = max(0; 	(l)i ); l = 2; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l (4.91)

(2)
i = max(0;	
(2)
i ); i = 1; :::; 4 (4.92)

(L)
i = min(1; ti) i = 1; :::; 2
L (4.93)

(l)
i = max(1; 1 	(l)i ) max(0; 1 	(l)i ); l = 3; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l: (4.94)
The interested reader can check that with this choice the vector (o; o(l)i ; l =
2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2l) satisfies the system of equations in (4.60). This establishes
the optimality of (o; o(l)i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l), i.e.,
Lsum = 1
2
log
1
d1
+ o +
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
o
(l)
i
(a)
=
1
2
log
1  2
d1d2(1  ()2) +
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
o
(l)
i
= RG(d1; d2);
where in (a) we have used the fact that (see Appendices B and C) 1+(1 
2)2
d1
=
1 2
d1d2(1 ()2) . This shows that Rsum(d1; d2)  RG(d1; d2) and completes the proof
of the converse in this case.
The case 2 < x < 1
We will provide a lower bound on the sum rate Rsum(d1; d2) and then we will
show that this lower bound equals RG(d1; d2) when o achieves both distortion
constraints. The lower bound that we use to prove the converse is a combination
of two other lower bounds derived in [55] and [56].
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Assume (R1; :::; R2L ; d1; d2) is strict sense achievable, then there exist en-
coders f (n)i ; i = 1; ::; 2
L and a decoder ('(n)1 ; '
(n)
2 ) satisfying (4.5) and (4.6). This
code will have some error covariance matrix bD
bD = 1
n
nX
t=1
bD(t); (4.95)
where bD(t) = E x(1)(t) dx(1)(t)x(1)(t) dx(1)(t)T : (4.96)
Tree Bound Define ((1)1 ; 
(1)
2 ) as follows

(1)
1 =
p
x =
s

(1 + 1)
p
1 + d1 + 2
p
2 + d2
(1 + 2)
p
2 + d2 + 1
p
1 + d1
; (4.97)

(1)
2 =


(1)
1
: (4.98)
With this choice we have (1)1 ; 
(1)
2 2 (; 1). Consider now three independent
zero mean Gaussian random variables x(0), z(1)1 and z
(1)
2 with respective variance
2
x(0)
= 1, 2
z
(1)
1
= 1   ((1)1 )2 and 2z(1)2 = 1   (
(1)
2 )
2. It is easy to check that the
covariancematrix of ((1)1 x(0)+z
(1)
1 ; 
(1)
2 x
0+z
(1)
2 ) isKx(1) . Therefore we can couple
these variables to

x
(1)
1 ; x
(1)
2

using
x
(1)
1 = 
(1)
1 x
(0) + z
(1)
1 (4.99)
x
(1)
2 = 
(1)
2 x
(0) + z
(1)
2 (4.100)
This auxiliary random variable x(0) can be written in terms of (x(1)1 ; x
(1)
2 ) as fol-
lows
x(0) = 1x
(1)
1 + 2x
(1)
2 + z
(0); (4.101)
where z(0) is a Gaussian random variable independent of x(1)1 and x
(1)
2 with vari-
ance 2
z(0)
2z(0) =
0@1 + (1)1

z
(1)
1
!2
+
 

(1)
2

z
(1)
2
!21A 1 ; (4.102)
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and
i =
2
z(0)
2
z
(1)
i

(1)
i i = 1; 2: (4.103)
It is easy to verify that z(0) is also independent of x(L)1 ; :::; x
(L)
2L
and a fortiori inde-
pendent of the messages C1; :::; C2L sent by the encoders. Usingdx(1)(t), we can
then obtain the following estimate of x(0)(t)
bx(0)(t) = Tdx(1)(t); (4.104)
where  = [1; 2]T . Now notice that
1
n
nX
t=1
E

Tx(1)(t)  Tdx(1)(t)2 = T bD: (4.105)
Consequently, from the independence of z(0) and (x(L)1 ; : : : ; x
(L)
2L
), we deduce
1
n
nX
t=1
E

x(0)(t) dx(0)(t)2 = T bD + 2z(0) def= d: (4.106)
Let x(0)n = (x(0)(1); :::; x(0)(n)), then we can obtain the following sequence of
identities
2LX
i=1
Ri  1
n
H(C ) (4.107)
=
1
n
I(C ; fx(l)i;n; l = 1; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2lg; x(0)n ) (4.108)
=
1
n
I(C ; x(0)n ) +
LX
l=1
2lX
i=1
1
n
I(CO(x(l)i )
;x
(l)
i;njx(l 1)d i
2
e;n) (4.109)
 1
2
log
1
d
+
LX
l=1
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i ; (4.110)
where we have defined
r
(1)
1
def
=
1
n
I(C1; :::; C2L 1 ;x
(1)
1;njx(0)n ) (4.111)
r
(1)
2
def
=
1
n
I(C2L 1+1; :::; C2L ;x
(1)
2;njx(0)n ) (4.112)
r
(l)
i
def
=
1
n
I(CO(x(l)i )
;x
(l)
i;njx(l 1)d i
2
e;n) for l = 2; :::; L and i = 1; :::; 2
l: (4.113)
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From Lemma 4 in [55], for all l = 1; :::; L  1 and i = 1; :::; 2l, we have
r
(l)
i  fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ); (4.114)
where
f
x
(l)
i
(r1; r2) =
1
2
log

1 + 2
z
(l)
i
[s
(l+1)
2i 1 (1  2 2r1) + s(l+1)2i (1  2 2r2)]

: (4.115)
Similarly using [62, Lemmas 2 and 3] we have
1
d
 1 +
2X
i=1
s
(1)
i

1  2 2r(1)i

; (4.116)
where s(1)i =


(1)
i

z
(1)
i
2
. Consequently, we can lower bound
P2L
i=1Ri by
2LX
i=1
Ri  Rtree(d); (4.117)
where Rtree(d) is given by
Rtree(d) =minimize
1
2
log
1
d
+
LX
l=1
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to
1
d
 1 +
2X
i=1
s
(1)
i

1  2 2r(1)i

r
(l)
i  fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ); l = 1; :::; L  1 i = 1; :::; 2l;
r
(l)
i  0 l = 1; :::; L i = 1; :::; 2l:
Matrix-distortion bound We start by verifying that bD is positive definite.
Note first that h(x(1)n jC ) >  1, this follows from
n
2LX
i=1
Ri  H(C )  h(x(1)n )  h(x(1)n jC ): (4.118)
By a classical argument we have
1
n
h(x(1)n jC ) 
1
n
h(x(1)n  dx(1)n )  12 log (2e)2jbDj : (4.119)
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From this we can conclude that bD is positive definite. Again by invoking the
conditional independence relations inherited from the Gauss-Markov tree, we
obtain the following sequence of identities
2LX
i=1
Ri  1
n
H(C ) (4.120)
=
1
n
I(C ; fx(l)i;n; l = 1; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2lg) (4.121)
=
1
n
I(C ;x(1)n ) +
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
1
n
I(CO(x(l)i )
;x
(l)
i;njx(l 1)d i
2
e;n) (4.122)
 1
2
log
 
jKx(1)j
jbDj
!
+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i ; (4.123)
As before, from Lemma 4 in [55], for all l = 2; :::; L  1 and i = 1; :::; 2l, we have
r
(l)
i  fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ): (4.124)
Now, note that
x(2) = (2)x(1) + z (2); (4.125)
where
(2) =
264 (2)1 (2)2 0 0
0 0 
(2)
3 
(2)
4
375
T
(4.126)
Using Lemma 7 in [56] we obtain5
h(x
(1)
1;njx(1)2;n;C ) 
n
2
log
 
2ebD 1(1; 1)
!
: (4.127)
Moreover, given x(1)n = (x
(1)
1;n; x
(1)
2;n) the quantities (x
(2)
1;n;CO(x(2)1 )
); :::; (x
(2)
4;n;CO(x(2)4 )
)
are independent. Using this condition it is not hard to see that the result of
lemma 8 in [56] remains valid, that is
n
2
log

2e
K (1; 1)

 h(x(1)1;njx(1)2;n;C ); (4.128)
5Note there is a typo in Lemma 7 in [56, page 19]. This typo is corrected in [56, page 26].
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where
K =K 1
x(1)
+ diag
 
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i (1  2 2r
(2)
i );
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i (1  2 2r
(2)
i )
!
: (4.129)
Combining these inequalities leads to
bD 1(1; 1) K 1
x(1)
(1; 1) +
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i (1  2 2r
(2)
i ) (4.130)
The vectors x(1) and x(2) being jointly Gaussian, we can find a Gaussian vector
v(2) that is independent of x(2) such that
x(1) =Kx(1)x(2)K
 1
x(2)
x(2) + v(2): (4.131)
The inverse of the covariance matrix of v(2) can be computed as follows
K 1
v(2)
=K 1
x(1)jx(2) =K
 1
x(1)
+ ((2))TK 1
z(2)
(2) (4.132)
=K 1
x(1)
+ diag(a; b); (4.133)
where a def=
P2
i=1 s
(2)
i and b
def
=
P4
i=3 s
(2)
i . We deduce that
K 1
v(2)
(1; 1) =K 1
x(1)
(1; 1) + a: (4.134)
Using this identity we can rewrite (4.130) as
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i K 1
v(2)
(1; 1)  bD 1(1; 1): (4.135)
A similar approach shows that
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i K 1
v(2)
(2; 2)  bD 1(2; 2): (4.136)
Consequently, we can lower bound
P2L
i=1Ri by
2LX
i=1
Ri  Rvec(bD); (4.137)
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where Rvec(bD) is given by
Rvec(bD) =minimize 1
2
log
 
jKx(1) j
jbDj
!
+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i K 1
v(2)
(1; 1)  bD 1(1; 1);
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i K 1
v(2)
(2; 2)  bD 1(2; 2);
r
(l)
i  fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ); l = 2; :::; L  1 i = 1; :::; 2l;
r
(l)
i  0 l = 2; :::; L i = 1; :::; 2l:
Combination of the two bounds In this sectionwewill couple the two bounds
found in parts (a) and (b) to provide a single lower bound on the sum rate. SincebD is positive definite, we can write it as
bD =
264 d^1 
p
d^1d^2

p
d^1d^2 d^2
375 ; (4.138)
where d^1  d1 and d^2  d2 and  2 ( 1; 1). Now let ' = 
p
d^1d^2p
d1d2
and
D' =
264 d1 'pd1d2
'
p
d1d2 d2
375 : (4.139)
ThenD'   bD = diag(d1   d^1; d2   d^2) and it follows that
bD D': (4.140)
As a consequence of this inequality, the following identities hold
jbDj  jD'j; (4.141)bD 1(1; 1) D 1' (1; 1); (4.142)bD 1(2; 2) D 1' (2; 2); (4.143)
d
def
= T bD + 2z(0)  d(') def= TD' + 2z(0) : (4.144)
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Since the functions Rvec() and Rtree() are decreasing we deduce that
Rvec(bD)  Rvec(D') (4.145)
Rtree(d)  Rtree(d(')): (4.146)
Combining the previous two bounds we obtain that for some ' 2 ( 1; 1)
2LX
i=1
Ri  max (Rvec(D'); Rtree(d('))) : (4.147)
Since (x(1);x(L)) are jointly Gaussian, we can write
x(1) = Ax(L) + v(L); (4.148)
withA =Kx(1)x(L)K
 1
x(L)
and v(L) ?? x(L), we deduce
bD =K v(L) +A bDx(L)AT ; (4.149)
with
bDx(L) = 1n
nX
t=1
E

x(L)(t) dx(L)(t)x(L)(t) dx(L)(t)T : (4.150)
It can also be verified that bDx(L) is nonsingular and hence positive definite. Since
A is full row-rank (rank(A) = 2), we also have that A bDx(L)AT is positive defi-
nite6. We deduce that7 bD  K v(L) and as a consequence D'  K v(L) . Hence if
we let S = f 2 ( 1; 1) :D K v(L)g, we have
2LX
i=1
Ri  inf
2S
max (Rvec(D); Rtree(d())) : (4.151)
We will now prove that
inf
2S
max (Rvec(D); Rtree(d())) = Rvec(D) = Rtree(d(
)); (4.152)
6This is easy to check since if u is a nonzero vector such that A bDx(L)ATu = 0 then
uTA bDx(L)ATu = 0. Since bDx(L) is positive definite it follows ATu = 0 from which we can
conclude that u = 0 sinceA has a full row rank.
7Note that this imposes conditions on the distortions d1 and d2. In particular we must have
d1 >Kv(L)(1; 1) and d2 >Kv(L)(2; 2).
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where  was defined in (4.204) and is given by
 =
p
(1  2)2 + 42d1d2   (1  2)
2
p
d1d2
: (4.153)
We start first by verifying that  2 S . To see this, recall that U = x(L) + . This
implies that
Kx(1)jU Kx(1)jx(L) =K v(L) : (4.154)
But when the optimal Gaussian channels achieves both distortion constraints
with equality we have (see Section 4.6) Kx(1)jU = D establishing therefore
D K v(L) , i.e.,  2 S .
It is easy to check that d() is an increasing function of . As a consequence,
the function Rtree(d()) is decreasing. Hence if   
max (Rvec(D); Rtree(d()))  Rtree(d())  Rtree(d()): (4.155)
In Section 4.8, we show that
RG(d1; d2) = Rtree(d()): (4.156)
It follows that
max (Rvec(D); Rtree(d()))  RG(d1; d2) 8  : (4.157)
We will now show that for   , Rvec(D)  Rvec(D). Define
M() =
(
(r
(2)
1 ; :::; r
(2)
4 ) :
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i  K v(2)(2; 2)jK v(2)j
  d2jDj ;
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i  K v(2)(1; 1)jK v(2)j
  d1jDj
)
: (4.158)
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UsingM(), we can rewrite Rvec(D) as
Rvec(D) =minimize
1
2
log
 jKx(1)j
jDj

+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to (r(2)1 ; :::; r
(2)
4 ) 2M()
r
(l)
i  fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ); l = 2; :::; L  1 i = 1; :::; 2l;
r
(l)
i  0 l = 2; :::; L i = 1; :::; 2l:
Since the functions
K
v(2)
(2;2)
jK
v(2)
j   d2jDj and
K
v(2)
(1;1)
jK
v(2)
j   d1jDj are decreasing we have
M()  M() for   . Moreover since 1
2
log
 jK
x(1)
j
jDj

 1
2
log
 jK
x(1)
j
jD j

, we
conclude that Rvec(D)  Rvec(D). It follows that for   
max (Rvec(D); Rtree(d()))  Rvec(D)  Rvec(D): (4.159)
We have proved in Section 4.9 that Rvec(D) = RG(d1; d2). Consequently,
max (Rvec(D); Rtree(d()))  RG(d1; d2) 8  : (4.160)
We conclude then that
2LX
i=1
Ri  inf
2S
max (Rvec(D); Rtree(d())) = RG(d1; d2): (4.161)
This being true for every strict sense achievable (R1; :::; R2L ; d1; d2), we deduce
Rsum(d1; d2)  RG(d1; d2): (4.162)
This completes the proof of the converse.
4.5 Proof of Lemma 15
For l 2 f1; :::; Lg, define x(l) = [x(l)1 ; :::; x(l)2l ]T . Relying on the tree structure, we
can use the chain rule for mutual information to compute the total rate of the
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Gaussian distributed test channel U = [U1; :::; U2L ]T as follows
I(x(L);U ) = I(x(1); :::;x(L);U ) (4.163)
= I(x(1);U ) +
LX
l=2
I(x(l);U jx(l 1)) (4.164)
=
1
2
log
 jKx(1) j
jDj

+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
I(x
(l)
i ;UO(x(l)i )
jx(l 1)d i
2
e ); (4.165)
where
D = E

(x(1)   E[x(1)jU ])(x(1)   E[x(1)jU ])T  : (4.166)
is the error covariance matrix achieved by U and O(x(l)i ) is the set of indices of
the variable nodes observed by the encoders (i.e., at level L) that are decedents
of x(l)i . For instance O(x(1)1 ) = f1; :::; 2L 1g and O(x(L 2)1 ) = f1; :::; 4g, that is
UO(x(1)1 )
= [U1; :::; U2L 1 ]
T and UO(x(L 2)1 ) = [U1; :::; U4]
T . Now define
r
(l)
i
def
= I(x
(l)
i ;UO(x(l)i )
jx(l 1)d i
2
e ): (4.167)
For l = 2; :::; L   1 and i = 1; :::; 2l, we will establish the following recurrence
formula
r
(l)
i =
1
2
log

1 + 2
z
(l)
i
[s
(l+1)
2i 1 (1  2 2r
(l+1)
2i 1 ) + s
(l+1)
2i (1  2 2r
(l+1)
2i )]

: (4.168)
To show this, we note that using the tree structure, we can write the following
identity
UO(x(l+1)j )
= a
(l+1)
j x
(l+1)
j +N
(l+1)
j j = 2i  1; 2i; (4.169)
where a(l+1)2i 1 ; a
(l+1)
2i are two given column vectors andN
(l+1)
2i 1 ;N
(l+1)
2i are two inde-
pendent Gaussian vectors. Since x(l+1)j = 
(l+1)
j x
(l)
i + z
(l+1)
j for j = 2i   1; 2i, we
deduce
UO(x(l+1)j )
= 
(l+1)
j a
(l+1)
j x
(l)
i +w
(l+1)
j j = 2i  1; 2i; (4.170)
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where w(l+1)j = a
(l+1)
j z
(l+1)
j +N
(l+1)
j . Using the relation x
(l)
i = 
(l)
i x
(l 1)
d i
2
e + z
(l)
i , we
can write
x
(l 1)
d i
2
e = x
(l)
i + v; (4.171)
where  = E
h
x
(l)
i x
(l 1)
d i
2
e
i
=2
x
(l)
i
and v is a Gaussian random variable independent
of x(l)i . Note that v is also going to be independent of (w
(l+1)
2i 1 ;w
(l+1)
2i ). Hence,
since UO(x(l)i ) = [U
T
O(x(l+1)2i 1 )
;U TO(x(l+1)2i )
]T , using [65, pp. 77] we have
1
2
x
(l)
i jUO(x(l)
i
)
;x
(l 1)
d i2 e
=
1
2
x
(l)
i
+
2
2v
+
2iX
j=2i 1


(l+1)
j
2
(a
(l+1)
j )
TK 1
w
(l+1)
j
a
(l+1)
j (4.172)
=
1
2
z
(l)
i
+
2iX
j=2i 1


(l+1)
j
2
(a
(l+1)
j )
TK 1
w
(l+1)
j
a
(l+1)
j ; (4.173)
where in the last equality we have used the fact that
1
2
z
(l)
i
=
1
2
x
(l)
i jx(l 1)d i2 e
=
1
2
x
(l)
i
+
2
2v
: (4.174)
By the independence of z(l+1)j and N
(l+1)
j and the matrix inversion lemma we
have
K 1
w
(l+1)
j
=K 1
N
(l+1)
j
 K 1
N
(l+1)
j
2
z
(l+1)
j
a
(l+1)
j (a
(l+1)
j )
TK 1
N
(l+1)
j
1 + 2
z
(l+1)
j
(a
(l+1)
j )
TK 1
N
(l+1)
j
a
(l+1)
j
; j = 2i  1; 2i:
(4.175)
This leads to
(a
(l+1)
j )
TK 1
w
(l+1)
j
a
(l+1)
j =
(a
(l+1)
j )
TK 1
N
(l+1)
j
a
(l+1)
j
1 + 2
z
(l+1)
j
(a
(l+1)
j )
TK 1
N
(l+1)
j
a
(l+1)
j
; j = 2i  1; 2i: (4.176)
We deduce that
1
2
x
(l)
i jUO(x(l)
i
)
;x
(l 1)
d i2 e
=
1
2
z
(l)
i
+
2iX
j=2i 1
(a
(l+1)
j )
TK 1
N
(l+1)
j
a
(l+1)
j
1 + 2
z
(l+1)
j
(a
(l+1)
j )
TK 1
N
(l+1)
j
a
(l+1)
j
: (4.177)
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A similar approach gives
1
2
x
(l+1)
j jUO(x(l+1)
j
)
;x
(l)
i
=
1
2
z
(l+1)
j
+ (a
(l+1)
j )
TK 1
N
(l+1)
j
a
(l+1)
j ; j = 2i  1; 2i: (4.178)
Combining these identities with the following two facts
r
(l)
i =
1
2
log
0B@ 2z(l)i
2
x
(l)
i jUO(x(l)
i
)
;x
(l 1)
d i2 e
1CA (4.179)
r
(l+1)
j =
1
2
log
0B@ 2z(l+1)j
2
x
(l+1)
j jUO(x(l+1)
j
)
;x
(l)
i
1CA j = 2i  1; 2i (4.180)
establishes (4.168). An expression for RG(d1; d2) can be then obtained through
the following optimization problem
RG(d1; d2) =minimize
1
2
log
 jKx(1) j
jDj

+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to D(1; 1)  d1;
D(2; 2)  d2
r
(L)
i  0; i = 1; :::; 2L:
We will try to make this optimization problem more explicit by expressingD in
terms of the the noise quantization rates r(2)1 ; :::; r
(2)
4 . We start by noting that
UO(x(1)1 )
=
264 (2)1 a(2)1

(2)
2 a
(2)
2
375x(1)1 +
264 w(2)1
w
(2)
2
375 (4.181)
and
UO(x(1)2 )
=
264 (2)3 a(2)3

(2)
4 a
(2)
4
375x(1)2 +
264 w(2)3
w
(2)
4
375 : (4.182)
We can write these 2 equations compactly as
U = x(1) +w(2): (4.183)
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where
 =
266666664

(2)
1 a
(2)
1 0

(2)
2 a
(2)
2 0
0 
(2)
3 a
(2)
3
0 
(2)
4 a
(2)
4
377777775
; (4.184)
andw(2) = [(w(2)1 )T ; :::; (w
(2)
4 )
T ]T . Since x(1) ?? w(2), we have (see for instance [65,
pp. 77])
D 1 =K 1
x(1)
+TK 1
w(2)
: (4.185)
By the independence of the vectors w(2)1 ; :::;w
(2)
4 , the covariance matrix Kw(2) is
going to be block diagonal. In this case, it can be verified that TK 1
w(2)
 is also a
diagonal matrix, i.e., TK 1
w(2)
 = diag(T1; T2)with T1; T2  0 given by
T1 =
2X
i=1


(2)
i
2
(a
(2)
i )
TK 1
w
(2)
i
a
(2)
i (4.186)
T2 =
4X
i=3


(2)
i
2
(a
(2)
i )
TK 1
w
(2)
i
a
(2)
i ; (4.187)
which can be written in terms of r(2)1 ; :::; r
(2)
4 (following the approach de-
scribed above) as
T1(r
(2)
1 ; r
(2)
2 ) =
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i (1  2 2r
(2)
i ) (4.188)
T2(r
(2)
3 ; r
(2)
4 ) =
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i (1  2 2r
(2)
i ): (4.189)
Now let
	(r
(2)
1 ; :::; r
(2)
4 ) =
[1 + (1  2)T1(r(2)1 ; r(2)2 )][1 + (1  2)T2(r(2)3 ; r(2)4 )]  2
1  2 :
(4.190)
Then after some algebraic manipulations, by using (4.185) we can rewrite
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RG(d1; d2) in terms of T1 and T2 as follows
RG(d1; d2) =minimize
1
2
log	(r
(2)
1 ; :::; r
(2)
4 ) +
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to
(1  2)[1 + (1  2)T2(r(2)3 ; r(2)4 )]
[1 + (1  2)T1(r(2)1 ; r(2)2 )][1 + (1  2)T2(r(2)3 ; r(2)4 )]  2
 d1;
(1  2)[1 + (1  2)T1(r(2)1 ; r(2)2 )]
[1 + (1  2)T1(r(2)1 ; r(2)2 )][1 + (1  2)T2(r(2)3 ; r(2)4 )]  2
 d2
r
(L)
i  0; i = 1; :::; 2L:
(4.191)
which is the result claimed in Lemma 15.
4.6 Proof of Lemma 16: The regularity of the optimal Gaussian
test channel
As mentioned before there are two case that must be distinguished. Case 1:
the optimal Gaussian test channel achieves only one distortion constraint with
equality and case 2: the optimal Gaussian test channel achieves both distortion
constraints with equality. In order to show that o is regular we will show that
o satisfies the linear independence constraint qualification [66, Theorem 12.1].
For that we need to check that the gradients of the active inequality constraints
and the gradients of the equality constraints are linearly independent at o. In
the following we let A = fi : o(L)i = 0g and ei be the ith vector of the standard
basis of R2L . To simplify the notations we will usually drop the argument of
C1(r
(L)
1 ; :::; r
(L)
2L 1) and write simply C1, this applies also for C2, T1 and T2.
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4.6.1 Case 1:
Recall that we are assuming here (without loss of generality) that C1 = 0 and
C2 < 0. We need to show that (rrC1jr=o; fei; i 2 Ag) are linearly independent.
We start by computing rrC1jr=o. For i = 1; :::; 2L 1, we have
@C1
@r
(L)
i
=  

(1  2)[1 + (1  2)T2]
[1 + (1  2)T1][1 + (1  2)T2]  2
2
@T1
@r
(L)
i
; (4.192)
with
@T1
@r
(L)
i
=
@T1(r
(2)
1 ; r
(2)
2 )
@r
(2)
d i
2L 2 e
L 1Y
l=2
@r
(l)
d i
2L l e
@r
(l+1)
d i
2L l 1 e
(4.193)
= 2 ln(2)s
(2)
d i
2L 2 e
2
 2r(2)d i
2L 2 e
L 1Y
l=2
2
z
(l)
d i
2L l e
s
(l+1)
d i
2L l 1 e
2
 2r(l+1)d i
2L l 1 e2
 2r(l)d i
2L l e : (4.194)
This last identity follows from the chain rule for partial derivative combined
with (4.11). From (4.11) and (4.14), we see that T1 = F (r
(L 1)
1 ; :::; r
(L 1)
2L 2 ) for some
function F , hence from the chain rule we have
@T1
@r
(L)
i
=
2L 2X
j=1
@T1
@r
(L 1)
j
@r
(L 1)
j
@r
(L)
i
: (4.195)
Using (4.11) again we can see that
@r
(L 1)
j
@r
(L)
i
= 0 for all j 6= d i
2
e which establishes
@T1
@r
(L)
i
=
@T1
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
@r
(L)
i
(4.196)
= s
(L)
i 
2
z
(L 1)
d i2 e
2 2r
(L)
i 2
 2r(L 1)d i2 e @T1
@r
(L 1)
d i
2
e
: (4.197)
Proceeding forward by induction we arrive at the claimed equality. For i =
2L 1 + 1; :::; 2L, we have similarly
@C1
@r
(L)
i
=  

(1  2)
[1 + (1  2)T1][1 + (1  2)T2]  2
2
@T2
@r
(L)
i
(4.198)
with @T2
@r
(L)
i
given by a similar expression as the one above. We can see therefore
that all the components of rrC1jr=o are nonzero. Since A 6= f1; :::; 2Lg, we must
have that (rrC1jr=o; fei; i 2 Ag) are linearly independent and hence o is regular.
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4.6.2 Case 2:
Here we have C1 = 0 and C2 = 0. To establish the regularity of o we must now
show that (rrC1jr=o;rrC2jr=o; fei; i 2 Ag) are linearly independent. We have
computed rrC1 above, we will also need to compute rrC2. For i = 1; :::; 2L 1,
we have
@C2
@r
(L)
i
=  

(1  2)
[1 + (1  2)T1][1 + (1  2)T2]  2
2
@T1
@r
(L)
i
: (4.199)
And for i = 2L 1 + 1; :::; 2L,
@C2
@r
(L)
i
=  

(1  2)[1 + (1  2)T1]
[1 + (1  2)T1][1 + (1  2)T2]  2
2
@T2
@r
(L)
i
: (4.200)
To simplify the upcoming derivations, let qi
def
= @T1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o; i = 1; :::; 2L 1 and qi def=
@T2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o; i = 2L 1 + 1; :::; 2L. And note that qi 6= 0 for all i. Using the fact that the
two distortion constraints are active at o, i.e., C1 = 0 and C2 = 0, we can find
an expression for T 1 and T 2 in terms of , d1 and d2. Let j = 1 + (1   2)T j ,
j = 1; 2. Since C1 = C2 = 0, we can see immediately that
d11 = d22: (4.201)
and
d2
2
2   (1  2)2   2d1 = 0: (4.202)
By solving these 2 equations we find that
T j = j
def
=
1
dj(1  ()2)  
1
1  2 ; j = 1; 2; (4.203)
where
 =
p
(1  2)2 + 42d1d2   (1  2)
2
p
d1d2
: (4.204)
We can now find simplified expressions for rrC1jr=o and rrC2jr=o. Using the
fact that C1 = 0, we have
@C1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =  d21qi; i = 1; :::; 2L 1: (4.205)
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and using C2 = 0we find that
@C2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =  d22qi; i = 2L 1 + 1; :::2L: (4.206)
Now recall that in Section 4.5 we have proved
D 1 =K 1
x(1)
+ diag(T 1 ; T

2 ): (4.207)
This means that
D 1 =
264 1d1(1 ()2)   1 2
  
1 2
1
d2(1 ()2)
375 : (4.208)
Using the identity
1  ()2 = (1  
2)

p
d1d2
: (4.209)
We deduce thatD =D , where
D =
264 d1 pd1d2

p
d1d2 d2
375 : (4.210)
and as such
(1  2)
[1 + (1  2)T 1 ][1 + (1  2)T 2 ]  2
2
=


jD j
jKx(1) j
2
(4.211)
=


d1d2(1  ()2)
1  2
2
(4.212)
= ()2d1d2: (4.213)
We have then
@C2
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =  ()2d1d2qi i = 1; :::; 2L 1; (4.214)
@C1
@r
(L)
i
jr=o =  ()2d1d2qi i = 2L 1 + 1; :::; 2L: (4.215)
Consequently,
rrC1jr=o =  [d21q1; :::; d21q2L 1 ; ()2d1d2q2L 1+1; :::; ()2d1d2q2L ]T ; (4.216)
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and
rrC2jr=o =  [()2d1d2q1; :::; ()2d1d2q2L 1 ; d22q2L 1+1; :::; d22q2L ]T : (4.217)
Using our initial assumption that d2 < 2d1 + 1   2, we will argue that there
exists i 2 f1; :::; 2L 1g and j 2 f2L 1+1; :::; 2Lg such that o(L)i ; o(L)j > 0. Indeed,
if for instance o(L)j = 0 for all 2
L 1+1  j  2L then it follows that o(2)3 = o(2)4 = 0
that is T 2 = T2(o
(2)
3 ; o
(2)
4 ) = 0 and 2 = 1. According to (4.202) this means that
d2 = 
2d1 + 1   2 which is impossible in view of the assumption. Since i and
j do not belong to A, if (rrC1jr=o;rrC2jr=o; fei; i 2 Ag) were to be linearly
dependent there must exist (c1; c2) 6= (0; 0) such that
c1d
2
1 + c2(
)2d1d2 = 0; (4.218)
c1(
)2d1d2 + c2d22 = 0: (4.219)
This is however not possible since  < 1, i.e., the matrix
264 d1 ()2d2
()2d1 d2
375 is
invertible.
4.7 Proof of Lemma 17
We start by remarking that f(x) = 2[1 + (1   x)(1 + 11)][1 + (1   x)1] is
decreasing on [2; 1] whereas g(x) = [x + (x   2)2][2x + (x   2)(1 + 22)] is
increasing. To show that the equation f(x) = g(x) has only one solution in the
interval [2; 1]when the optimal Gaussian test channel achieves both distortions
with equality, we will show that
f(1)  g(1); (4.220)
g(2)  f(2); (4.221)
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and at most one of the inequalities above can be an equality. To establish this
recall first that
1 = 1d
2
1 + 2(
)2d1d2   d1 (4.222)
2 = 2d
2
2 + 1(
)2d1d2   d2; (4.223)
with 1; 2  0. After some transformations we can show that this system of
equations is equivalent to
d2(1 + d1) = (
)2d1(2 + d2) + 1d21d2(1  ()4); (4.224)
d1(2 + d2) = (
)2d2(1 + d1) + 2d22d1(1  ()4): (4.225)
Since 1; 2  0 and  < 1we must have
d2(d1 + 1)  ()2d1(2 + d2); (4.226a)
d1(d2 + 2)  ()2d2(1 + d1): (4.226b)
Clearly 1 and 2 can not be both equal to zero, because in this case ti > 0 for
i 2 f1; :::; 2Lg and hence o(L)i = 0 for all i (refer to (4.22)). This means that at most
one of the inequalities above can be an equality.
Using the following identities
1 + (1  2)1 = 

r
d2
d1
; (4.227)
1 + (1  2)2 = 

r
d1
d2
; (4.228)
d1d2(1  ()2) = (1  2)
pd1d2

: (4.229)
The two inequalities in (4.226) can be written as follows
(1 + (1  2)1)((1 + (1  2)1)1 + (1  2))  22; (4.230)
(1 + (1  2)2)((1 + (1  2)2)2 + (1  2))  21; (4.231)
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or equivalently
f(2)  g(2) (4.232)
g(1)  f(1): (4.233)
Moreover, as we said above, at most one of the inequalities above can be an
equality. This proves that the equation f(x) = g(x) has only one root in the
interval [2; 1]. A tedious computation8 shows that this root is given by
x = 
(1 + 1)
p
1 + d1 + 2
p
2 + d2
(1 + 2)
p
2 + d2 + 1
p
1 + d1
: (4.234)
4.8 Rtree(d()) = RG(d1; d2)
In this section we will prove that Rtree(d()) = RG(d1; d2). Recall that 
(1)
1 is
selected to be equal to
p
x where x is the solution in the interval (2; 1) to the
quadratic equation
2[1+(1 x)(1+11)][1+ (1 x)1] = [x+(x  2)2][2x+(x  2)(1+22)]
(4.235)
Recall also that
Rtree(d(
)) =minimize
1
2
log
1
d()
+
LX
l=1
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to
1
d()
 1 + x

1  x

1  2 2r(1)1

+
2
x   2

1  2 2r(1)2

r
(l)
i  fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ); l = 1; :::; L  1 i = 1; :::; 2l;
r
(l)
i  0 l = 1; :::; L i = 1; :::; 2l:
8This can be proved by showing that x is also a root to the equation 2(1 + d1)(1 + (1  
x)1)
2 = (2 + d2)(x+ (x  2)2)2.
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The optimization problem defining Rtree(d()) is convex, the KKT condi-
tions can be then used as a certificate of optimality. After some simplifica-
tions, the KKT conditions for this optimization problem state that the tuple
(r
(l)
i ; l = 1; :::L; i = 1; :::; 2
l) is optimal if and only if we can find   0,
(
(l)
i ; l = 1; :::L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l)  0 and ((l)i ; l = 1; :::L; i = 1; :::; 2l)  0 such that
0 = 1 + 
(1)
1   (1)1  
x2 2r
(1)
1
1  x (4.236a)
0 = 1 + 
(1)
2   (1)2  
22 2r
(1)
2
x   2 (4.236b)
0 = 1 + 
(l)
i   (l)i   (l 1)d i
2
e s
(l)
i 
2
z
(l 1)
d i2 e
2 2r
(l)
i 2
 2f
x
(l 1)
d i2 e ; l = 2; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l
(4.236c)
0 = 1  (L)i   (L 1)d i
2
e s
(L)
i 
2
z
(L 1)
d i2 e
2 2r
(L)
i 2
 2f
x
(L 1)
d i2 e ; i = 1; :::; 2L (4.236d)
0 = 
(l)
i r
(l)
i ; l = 1; :::L; i = 1; :::; 2
l: (4.236e)
We will now identify the solution to this system using the optimal Gaussian
channel o. Define first o(1)1 and o
(1)
2 as follows
o
(1)
1
def
=
1
2
log
 
1 + (1  x)
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i (1  2 2o
(2)
i )
!
=
1
2
log(1 + (1  x)1) (4.237)
o
(1)
2
def
=
1
2
log
 
1 + (1  
2
x
)
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i (1  2 o
(2)
i )
!
=
1
2
log(1 + (1  
2
x
)2): (4.238)
Using the characterization of o derived in section 4.3.2, we can verify that
(o
(l)
i ; l = 1; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l) satisfy the KKT conditions above with an appro-
priate choice of parameters. But before describing this choice we note here that
(o
(l)
i ; l = 1; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l) is feasible for the optimization problem defining
Rtree(d(
)). Indeed, (o(l)i ; l = 1; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l) satisfies all the constraints
defining the feasible set of Rtree(d()) and in particular
1 +
x
1  x (1  2
 2o(1)1 ) +
2
x   2 (1  2
 2o(1)2 ) =
1
d()
: (4.239)
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Now for the choice of the KKT parameters, we select (1)1 = 
(1)
2 = 0,

(1)
1 =
(1 + (1  x)1)1
1  x ; (4.240)

(1)
2 =
(1 + (1  2
x )2)2
1  2
x
: (4.241)
and
 =
1
x
(1  x)(1 + (1)1 )(1 + (1  x)1): (4.242)
With this choice we can see that (4.236a) and (4.236b) are verified by o(1)1 and o
(1)
2 .
Indeed, for (4.236a) just notice that
x2 2o
(1)
1
1  x = 1 + 
(1)
1 : (4.243)
For verifying (4.236b), we use the fact that x is a solution of the quadratic equa-
tion (4.235). This allow us to show that
 =
1
2
(x   2)(1 + (1)2 )(1 + (1 
2
x
)2): (4.244)
From this, we see that
22 2o
(1)
2
x   2 = 1 + 
(1)
2 ; (4.245)
which is what we need for (4.236b). The rest of the KKT parameters are selected
as follows

(l)
i = max(0; 	(l)i ); l = 2; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l (4.246)

(2)
i = max(0;	
(2)
i ); i = 1; :::; 4 (4.247)

(l)
i = max(1; 1 	(l)i ) max(0; 1 	(l)i ); l = 3; :::; L  2; i = 1; :::; 2l (4.248)

(L)
i = min(1; ti) i = 1; :::; 2
L (4.249)
The interested reader can easily verify that with this choice (o(l)i ; l = 1; :::; L; i =
1; :::; 2l) satisfy the KKT conditions above, we omit this verification here since
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it is very similar to the one performed in IV.A. This shows the optimality of
(o
(l)
i ; l = 1; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l), i.e.,
Rtree(d(
)) =
1
2
log

1
d()

+ o
(1)
1 + o
(1)
2 +
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
o
(l)
i : (4.250)
From the chain rule of mutual information and standard calculations we have
1
2
log
 jKx(1)j
jD j

= I(x(1);U ) = I(x(0);U ) + I(x
(1)
1 ;U jx(0)) + I(x(1)2 ;U jx(0))
=
1
2
log

1
d()

+ o
(1)
1 + o
(1)
2 : (4.251)
We conclude therefore that
RG(d1; d2) = Rtree(d()): (4.252)
4.9 Rvec(D) = RG(d1; d2)
In this section we will prove that Rvec(D) = RG(d1; d2). To establish this equal-
ity one can follow a similar approach to the one descried in Section 4.8. However
we will provide here a somewhat different method that exploits the similarities
between the optimization problems definingRvec(D) andRG(d1; d2). When the
optimal Gaussian test channel achieves both distortion constraints with equal-
ity, the optimization problem defining RG(d1; d2) is equivalent to
RG(d1; d2) =minimize
1
2
log	(r
(2)
1 ; :::; r
(2)
4 ) +
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to C1(r
(L)
1 ; :::; r
(L)
2L 1) = 0
C2(r
(L)
2L 1+1; :::; r
(L)
2L
) = 0
r
(L)
i  0; i = 1; :::; 2L:
(4.253)
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As described in Section 4.6, the conditions C1(r
(L)
1 ; :::; r
(L)
2L 1) = 0 and
C2(r
(L)
2L 1+1; :::; r
(L)
2L
) = 0 are equivalent to T1(r
(2)
1 ; r
(2)
2 ) = 1 and T2(r
(2)
3 ; r
(2)
4 ) = 2.
Which is similar to
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i = a  1; (4.254)
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i = b  2: (4.255)
Moreover,
1
2
log
 
[1 + (1  2)T1(r(2)1 ; r(2)2 )][1 + (1  2)T2(r(2)3 ; r(2)4 )]  2
1  2
!
=
1
2
log

1  2
d1d2(1  ()2)

(4.256)
We can write therefore that9
RG(d1; d2) =minimize
1
2
log

1  2
d1d2(1  ()2)

+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i = a  1;
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i = b  2
r
(L)
i  0; i = 1; :::; 2L:
(4.257)
9It can be noted here that this optimization problem can be decoupled into two subproblems.
In the first one we would minimize
PL
l=2
P2l 1
i=1 r
(l)
i subject to
P2
i=1 s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i = a   1 and in
the second, we minimize
PL
l=2
P2l
i=2l 1+1 r
(l)
i subject to
P4
i=3 s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i = b  2.
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Now recall that
Rvec(D) =minimize
1
2
log
 jKx(1)j
jDj

+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i  K v(2)(2; 2)jK v(2)j
  d2jDj ;
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i  K v(2)(1; 1)jK v(2)j
  d1jDj
r
(l)
i  fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ); l = 2; :::; L  1 i = 1; :::; 2l;
r
(l)
i  0 l = 2; :::; L i = 1; :::; 2l:
Recall also that
K 1
v(2)
=K 1
x(1)jx(2) =K
 1
x(1)
+ diag(a; b): (4.258)
This shows
K v(2)(2; 2)
jK v(2) j
  d2jDj =
1
1  2 + a 
1
d1(1  ()2) = a  1 (4.259)
K v(2)(1; 1)
jK v(2) j
  d1jDj =
1
1  2 + b 
1
d2(1  ()2) = b  2: (4.260)
That is
Rvec(D) =minimize
1
2
log

1  2
d1d2(1  ()2)

+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
r
(l)
i
subject to
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i  a  1;
4X
i=2
s
(2)
i 2
 2r(2)i  b  2;
r
(l)
i  fx(l)i (r
(l+1)
2i 1 ; r
(l+1)
2i ); l = 2; :::; L  1 i = 1; :::; 2l;
r
(l)
i  0 l = 2; :::; L i = 1; :::; 2l:
(4.261)
We start by showing that RG(d1; d2)  Rvec(D). By comparing (4.257) and
(4.261), we can clearly see that (o(l)i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l) is in the feasible set
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of the optimization problem defining Rvec(D). Hence
RG(d1; d2) =
1
2
log

1  2
d1d2(1  ()2)

+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
o
(l)
i (4.262)
 Rvec(D): (4.263)
We would like now to show the reverse inequality. Let (b(l)i ; l = 2; :::; L; i =
1; :::; 2l) be the optimal solution to the convex optimization problem defining
Rvec(D) in (4.261). To prove that RG(d1; d2)  Rvec(D), we will show that
(b
(l)
i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l) lies in the feasible set of the optimization prob-
lem defining RG(d1; d2). The optimization problem in (4.261) is convex, we can
therefore use the KKT conditions to identify (b(l)i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l). The
KKT conditions for this problem state that there exists (%1; %2; &
(l)
i ; l = 2; :::; L; i =
1; :::; 2l)  0 and ((l)i ; l = 2; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l)  0 such that
0 = 1  &(2)i + (2)i   %1s(2)i 2 2b
(2)
i ; i = 1; 2 (4.264a)
0 = 1  &(2)i + (2)i   %2s(2)i 2 2b
(2)
i ; i = 3; 4 (4.264b)
0 = 1  &(l)i + (l)i   (l 1)d i
2
e s
(l)
i 
2
z
(l 1)
d i2 e
2 2b
(l)
i 2
 2f
x
(l 1)
d i2 e ; l = 3; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l; :
(4.264c)
0 = %1(a  1  
2X
i=1
s
(2)
i 2
 2b(2)i ) (4.264d)
0 = %2(b  2  
4X
i=3
s
(2)
i 2
 2b(2)i ) (4.264e)
0 = 1  &(L)i   (L 1)d i
2
e s
(L)
i 
2
z
(L 1)
d i2 e
2 2b
(L)
i 2
 2f
x
(L 1)
d i2 e ; i = 1; :::; 2L (4.264f)
0 = 
(l)
i

b
(l)
i   fx(l)i (b
(l+1)
2i 1 ; b
(l+1)
2i )

; l = 2; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l (4.264g)
0 = &
(l)
i b
(l)
i ; l = 2; :::L; i = 1; :::; 2
l: (4.264h)
Assume %1 = 0, then from (4.264a) we must have &
(2)
i > 0 for i = 1; 2. From
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complementary slackness this implies that b(2)1 = b
(2)
2 = 0. This is not possible10
since we must have a  1 
P2
i=1 s
(2)
i 2
 2b(2)i . This proves that %1 > 0. A similar
argument shows that %2 > 0. Since %1; %2 > 0, we conclude from (4.264d) and
(4.264e) that a  1 =
P2
i=1 s
(2)
i 2
 2b(2)i and b  2 =
P4
i=3 s
(2)
i 2
 2b(2)i .
We will verify now that
f
x
(l)
i
(b
(l+1)
2i 1 ; b
(l+1)
2i ) = b
(l)
i ; l = 2; :::; L  1; i = 1; :::; 2l: (4.265)
First, if (l)i > 0, then (4.265) will simply follow from (4.264g). Now assume

(l)
i = 0, then from (4.264c) we deduce that &
(l+1)
2i 1 ; &
(l+1)
2i > 0 and from com-
plementary slackness b(l+1)2i 1 = b
(l+1)
2i = 0. Since 0  b(l)i  fx(l)i (b
(l+1)
2i 1 ; b
(l+1)
2i ),
we will have b(l)i = 0 and hence (4.265) is trivially satisfied. This proves that
(b
(l)
i ; l = 2; :::; L; i = 1; :::; 2
l) is in the feasible set of the optimization problem in
(4.257) and therefore
RG(d1; d2)  1
2
log

1  2
d1d2(1  ()2)

+
LX
l=2
2lX
i=1
b
(l)
i ; (4.266)
= Rvec(D): (4.267)
This combined with the previous inequality shows that RG(d1; d2) = Rvec(D).
10Recall that 1; 2 > 0 which is a consequence of the assumption max(d1; d2) <
2min(d1; d2) + 1  2.
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